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A Tightrope Over Both Your Houses: 
Ensuring Party Participation and 
Preserving Mediation’s Core Values 
in Foreclosure Mediation 
Heather Scheiwe Kulp* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. The Foreclosure Crisis 
The headlines blister with news about the latest number of homes lost to 
foreclosure.  In 2010, 2.9 million homes received foreclosure filings—a 
35.7% increase from 2009 to 2010.1  The foreclosure crisis only accelerated 
from there; in 2012, 9.5 million homes were at risk of default and 4 million 
homes had been in foreclosure since the crisis began in 2007.2  A 2011 
estimate predicted foreclosures would peak in 2013, but the effects—
depressed housing prices, distressed neighborhoods, and downtrodden 
families—linger long after.3 
 
*Heather Scheiwe Kulp is the Clinical Fellow at Harvard Law School’s Negotiation and Mediation 
Clinical Program.  J.D. Northwestern University School of Law; B.A., Saint Olaf College. This 
study came from the author’s work at the Center for Conflict Resolution/Resolution Systems 
Institute as a Skadden Fellow, a two-year grant funded by the Skadden Fellowship Foundation. 
 1. Corbett B. Daly, Home Foreclosures in 2010 Top 1 Million this Year, REUTERS (Jan. 13, 
2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/13/us-usa-housing-foreclosures-
idUSTRE70C0YD20110113; Jon Prior, 3.8m Homes to Receive Foreclosure Filing in 2010, 
HOUSING WIRE, June 9, 2010, http://www.housingwire.com/articles/8044-realtytrac-38m-homes-
receive-foreclosure-filing-2010. 
 2. Nick Carey, Americans Brace for Next Foreclosure Wave, REUTERS (Apr. 4, 2012), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/04/us-foreclosure-idUSBRE83319E20120404; Jessica 
Silver-Greenberg, Despite Aid, Borrowers Still Face Foreclosure, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2013, at B1. 
 3. Joe Weisenthal, Michelle Meyer: Home Prices will Continue to Plunge, and 2012 will be 
the Worst Year for Foreclosures in History, BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec. 3, 2011), 
http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-12-03/markets/30471154_1_foreclosure-process-home-
prices-housing-crisis. 
1
Kulp: A Tightrope Over Both Your Houses: Ensuring Party Participation a
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2014
 204 
The foreclosure crisis certainly impacts the housing market, but 
localities are starting to understand that home loss touches every resident, 
regardless of the resident’s homeownership status.  Borrowers whose homes 
are foreclosed upon face years of drastically lowered credit scores, which 
greatly reduce the likelihood they will ever obtain a loan.4  Neighborhoods 
with only a few foreclosures decreased housing values and increased the 
likelihood that more homes in the neighborhood would go into foreclosure.5  
Abandoned homes may entice drug dealers and other criminal enterprises to 
settle in a neighborhood.6  Cities often increase property taxes to account for 
the estimated $30,000 it costs to secure and maintain foreclosed homes.7  
Banks in areas with even moderate rates of foreclosure pull back available 
resources, further limiting the number of people—including stable middle- 
to upper-middle class families—who qualify for loans.8  Home loss and 
decreased access to home ownership send communities into an economic 
tailspin.  States need solutions to help these localities. 
Early in the crisis, which first struck in 2007, states experimented with 
advising borrowers, hoping education would remedy, slow, or at least 
decrease the impact of the foreclosure crisis on local communities.  In early 
2008, NeighborWorks America, a congressionally created affordable 
housing and community development organization, gave grants to thirty-one 
state housing departments to train housing counselors in foreclosure 
mitigation.9  In 2008, the hard-hit state of Arizona appropriated $275,000 for 
at-risk borrower pre-foreclosure outreach and education. 10   To help 
communities buy back foreclosed homes and revamp them into affordable 
housing, Boston Community Capital, a non-profit community development 
financial institution, began Aura Mortgage Advisors to educate borrowers 
 
 4. Les Christie, How Foreclosures Impacts Your Credit Score, CNN (Apr. 22, 2010), 
http://money.cnn.com/2010/04/22/real_estate/foreclosure_credit_score/index.htm. 
 5. WILLIAM C. APGAR, MARK DUDA, & ROCHELLE NAWROCKI GOREY, The Municipal Cost 
of Foreclosure: A Chicago Case Study, HOMEOWNERSHIP PRESERVATION FOUNDATION, 55 (2005), 
http://www.nw.org/network/neighborworksProgs/foreclosuresolutionsOLD/documents/2005Apgar-
DudaStudy-FullVersion.pdf. 
 6. Id. at 11. 
 7. Id. at 12, app. A. 
 8. Jody Shenn & John Gittelsohn, Home Buying Gets Tougher as Lenders Restrict FHA 
Loans, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 17, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-17/home-
ownership-gets-harder-for-americans-as-lenders-restrict-fha-mortgages.html. 
 9. NEIGHBORWORKS AMERICA, National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling Program 
Location of Awardees and Projected Sub-grantees, (2008), 
http://www.nw.org/network/nfmcp/documents/ProjectedRevised_LocationofNFMCAwardeesandSu
bGrantees.pdf. 
 10. Foreclosures Affect Everyone, DISTRICT 5 NEWSLETTER (Councilman Claude Mattox, 
Phoenix, AZ), June 2008, http://phoenix.gov/district5/news/mc/d5June08.html (last visited Aug. 17, 
2012). 
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and finance the purchase of foreclosed homes in late 2008.11  Even with 
innovative responses, however, the problem did not abate.  Cities, counties, 
and states sought a more comprehensive way to resolve the foreclosure 
crisis: foreclosure mediation. 
B. Mediation to Mitigate the Crisis 
Mediation, a process by which a neutral third party facilitates discussion 
between parties about their conflict and their options for resolution, 12 
appealed to those looking to manage the foray.13  States and municipalities 
noticed how well mediation worked to manage other large-scale crises.14  
They also recognized that courts have successfully used mediation to reduce 
caseloads and help litigants reach their own resolutions for decades.15 
Why has mediation been successful in those contexts?  Qualities that 
distinguish the mediation process from other dispute resolution processes, 
set forth particularly well in the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, 
lend support to resolving these conflicts in a mutually satisfactory way.16  
Mediation, a voluntary and confidential discussion between disputants 
facilitated by a competent and neutral person, gathers invested parties to 
 
 11. Foreclosure Relief, BOSTON COMMUNITY CAPITAL, 
http://www.bostoncommunitycapital.org/what/foreclosure-relief (last updated 2011). 
 12. Though processes vary, basic mediation includes: (1) describing the process, (2) telling the 
story from each party’s perspective, (3) exchanging information, (4) identifying the issues, (5) 
bargaining and generating options, and (6) reaching an agreement.  Jennifer Stepp, How Does the 
Mediation Process Work?, MEDIATE.COM (Feb. 2003), http://www.mediate.com/articles/steppJ.cfm 
(last visited Aug. 17, 2012). 
 13. See, e.g., Gerald Lebovits & Lucero Ramirez Hidalgo, Alternative Dispute Resolution in 
Real Estate Matters: The New York Experience, 11 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 437 (2010) 
(discussing the benefits of mediation for real estate situations, particularly foreclosures). 
 14. See, e.g., Joyce Hoelting, Lessons Learned from 22 Years of Debt Mediation, FED. 
RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS (May 1, 2009), 
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=4193 (discussing the farm-
lender mediation program begun during the 1980s farm crisis); Susan Zuckerman, Mediation 
Program Helps Miss. and La. Rebuild After Katrina and Rita, 61 (3) DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
JOURNAL 1 (2006), https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_004328 (outlining the 
insurance mediation program initiated after Hurricane Katrina). 
 15. See an extensive database of state and federal court mediation programs at COURT ADR 
ACROSS THE U.S., http://courtadr.org/court-adr-across-the-us/ (last visited June 3, 2014). 
 16. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (2005), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/dispute/documents/model_standards_conduc
t_april2007.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter MODEL STANDARDS]. 
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focus on one matter for a discrete period of time.17  The mediator assists the 
parties in articulating their own needs and interests, and then works with 
them to develop a consensus that meets some or all of those needs.18  A 
competent, impartial mediator helps balance power dynamics between 
parties and promotes equal communication.19  The discussion is not limited 
to issues relevant in a court proceeding, so the mediator can also address 
emotions that may arise in a conflict, recognizing them and addressing the 
deeper issues to which they may point. 20   As a confidential process, 
mediation also promotes open, candid communication about a problem and 
its potential solutions.21  Mediation provides parties with the ability to 
determine their own outcome, rather than have a court or other 
administrative body decide the dispute for them.22 
These characteristics make mediation a promising process to mitigate 
the foreclosure crisis.  Mediation offers an opportunity for personal 
communication between a lender representative—a servicer 23 —and a 
borrower.  In mediation, the borrowers and servicers can explore options for 
settlement, including options for the borrower to retain his or her home.  The 
neutral can help balance power dynamics between a large corporation and a 
single borrower by asking questions that an adjudicator cannot.  A trained, 
impartial person can also acknowledge and work with emotions that may 
arise—anger, frustration, sorrow, etc.—whereas those emotions would be 
irrelevant in court.  Finally, mediation is confidential; borrowers may not 
want their financial information public, and servicers may not want their 
offers to set precedent for other agreements. 
Perhaps these benefits, coupled with the foreclosure crisis’s place in the 
political limelight, are why foreclosure mediation programs are developing 
 
 17. Michael Leathes, Stop Shoveling Smoke! Give Users a Classic Definition of Mediation, 
MEDIATE.COM (Sept. 2011), http://www.mediate.com/articles/LeathesM3.cfm. 
 18. Frequently Asked Questions About Mediation, ALLIANCE FOR EDUCATION IN DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION, http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/alliance/resources/basics/Mediation_FAQ.htm (last updated 
Oct. 12, 2005). 
 19. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 16, at 4, 5. 
 20. Melinda S. Gehris, Good Mediators Don’t Ignore Emotion, 46 NEW HAMPSHIRE BAR J. 28 
(2005). 
 21. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 16, at 6; Lawrence Freedman, Confidentiality: A Closer 
Look, in CONFIDENTIALITY IN MEDIATION: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE (1985). 
 22. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 16, at 3-4. 
 23. Throughout this article, I will use the term “servicer” to indicate a representative for the 
lender’s interests.  Sometimes, the representative is the original lender.  Often, though, the original 
lender has sold the mortgage loan one or more times to other entities and/or has hired an entity to 
service the loan while the lender still holds the actual loan.  Thus, the title “servicer” is more 
appropriate than “bank” or “lender” to indicate the party that will appear to represent the interests of 
those who own the loan debt.  I will also use “borrower” to indicate a representative for the person or 
persons who received the mortgage loan. 
4
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol14/iss2/3
[Vol. 14: 203, 2014]  
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL 
207 
at a much more rapid rate than other court- or government-approved 
mediation program.  Since 2007, over twenty-five states, counties, or 
municipalities adopted a form of foreclosure mediation as part of the state’s 
judicial24 or non-judicial25 foreclosure process.26  While program structures, 
goals, and outcomes differ greatly, such general enthusiasm about mediation 
is refreshing, especially for longtime advocates who struggle to ignite 
interest in mediation programs as a pathway to justice for low-income 
individuals.27  However, there is tension between foreclosure mediation 
program administrators’ desires to ensure equal bargaining and worthwhile 
party participation, and the established role of the mediator. 
The purpose of this article is to describe and analyze current efforts to 
address the nation’s foreclosure crisis through the use of mediation, and to 
offer guidance concerning mediation program design elements that will best 
satisfy competing goals.  In Part I, I describe the foreclosure crisis and 
current mediation programs.  I highlight a particular tension between 
mediation’s core values of confidentiality and self-determination and one 
foreclosure dispute resolution program’s focus on holding parties 
accountable for undesirable behavior.  In Part II, I describe three levels of 
accountability in current foreclosure mediation programs, from objective to 
subjective: attendance of specified parties, exchange of documentation, and 
participation in good faith.  These contrast with the priorities and rules under 
which court-connected mediation has historically operated.  Part III explores 
the inherent conflict between mediation’s traditional values and foreclosure 
mediation programs that hold parties accountable for following a particular 
standard.  Part IV proposes practical dispute system design elements that 
 
 24. Some states require foreclosures to be filed in state court.  Judicial foreclosure states that 
have developed local or statewide foreclosure mediation include: Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, 
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New 
York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and Vermont. 
 25. Some states do not require foreclosures to be filed in state court.  Instead, the foreclosure 
notice is sent directly to the borrower, then a sale of the property is scheduled.  Usually, there is no 
government interaction in the process until the foreclosure sale is completed.  Non-judicial 
foreclosure states that have developed local or statewide foreclosure mediation include: Arizona, the 
District of Columbia, Hawaii, Iowa, Massachusetts, Nevada, Rhode Island and Washington. 
 26. See Heather Scheiwe Kulp, Foreclosure Dispute Resolution Program Models State-by-
State, RESOLUTION SYSTEMS INSTITUTE, 
http://www.aboutrsi.org/pfimages/ForeclosureMediationProgramModels_September2012.pdf (last 
updated Sept. 19, 2012) [hereinafter Models]. 
 27. See, e.g., Susan M. Yates, Accessing Justice through Mediation: Pathways for Poor and 
Low-Income Disputants, CENTER FOR ANALYSIS OF COURT ADR SYSTEMS. 
http://courtadr.org/files/AccessingJustice.pdf (last visited June 3, 2014). 
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will balance the benefits of accountability with the core values that make 
mediation a meaningful, effective dispute resolution method. 
II. MEDIATION AS A RESPONSE TO THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS 
A. Mediation’s Core Values and Recent Foreclosure Mediation Case Law 
Some states have codified mediation’s core principles, including 
confidentiality,28 by adopting the Uniform Mediation Act (UMA).29  While 
the Model Standards mandates that mediators “maintain the confidentiality 
of all information obtained by the mediator in mediation, unless otherwise 
agreed to by the parties or required by applicable law,”30 the UMA further 
restricts disclosure of mediation communications, either to an adjudicative 
body (privileged communication) 31  or to anyone outside of mediation 
(confidential communication).32   As in the Model Standards, mediation 
communications are confidential to the degree the parties agree to or as 
dictated by state law,33 but the UMA also dictates that a mediator cannot 
disclose mediation communications to any authoritative body that may 
render a decision about the dispute with very limited exceptions.34 
Of particular relevance to the foreclosure mediation context, the UMA 
prohibits mediators from making “a report, assessment, evaluation, 
recommendation, finding, or other communication regarding a mediation to 
a court, administrative agency, or other authority that may make a ruling on 
the dispute that is the subject of the mediation.”35  The mediator may only 
 
 28. Uniform Mediation Act,  §§ 7-8, available at 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/mediation/uma_final_03.pdf (last revised 2003) 
[hereinafter UMA]. 
 29. Eleven states have adopted the UMA, drafted in 2001 by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association Section of Dispute 
Resolution as a standard for mediation practice in state courts. David A. Hoffman, Introduction: 
Uniform Mediation Act Symposium Issue, 61 J. DISP. RES. 1, 1 (2003), available at 
http://bostonlawcollaborative.com/blc/61-BLC/version/default/part/AttachmentData/data/2005-07-
intro-uma-symposium.pdf?branch=main&language=default.  The Act has been adopted in District of 
Columbia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and 
Washington.  UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Mediation+Act  (last visited June 3, 2014). 
 30. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 16, at 6. 
 31. UMA, supra note 28, at §§ 4-7. 
 32. UMA, supra note 28, at § 8 
 33. UMA, supra note 28, at § 8. 
 34. UMA, supra note 28, at §§ 4(a), 7(a).  Exceptions are enumerated in § 6. 
 35. UMA, supra note 28, at § 7(a). 
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report attendance, whether a mediation session occurred, and whether a 
settlement was reached, but not the terms of the settlement.36 
Some states did not adopt the UMA, but rather created their own 
mediation standards or had the court create mediation standards.37  Even in 
states without codified mediator standards, some mediation programs, 
including foreclosure mediation programs, 38  have adopted the Model 
Standards. Most mediators operate under a general understanding and 
acceptance of these principles. 
While many of the accepted mediation principles, including 
confidentiality, complement and enhance a process by which servicers and 
borrowers meet to discuss resolutions to foreclosure, those responding to the 
foreclosure crisis sometimes overlook such principles in the interest of 
responding to legitimate concerns about the foreclosure crisis.  As a 
consequence, some stakeholders have insisted on goals that conflict with 
mediation’s core principles and jeopardize the integrity of the mediation 
process.39 
 
 36. UMA, supra note 28, at § 7(b)(1); Florida’s Supreme Court clarified its mediation 
reporting requirement after foreclosures mediators were reporting that parties “reached impasse with 
a plan of action.”  The clarification was to remove such a reporting option and allowing mediators to 
indicate only that there was an agreement or no agreement.  Supreme Court of Florida, In Re: 
Guidance Concerning Managed Mediation Programs for Residential Mortgage Foreclosure Cases, 
Admin. Order No. AOSC10-57, 4 (2010), 
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/clerk/adminorders/2010/AOSC10-57.pdf. 
 37. See, e.g., CODE OF CONDUCT FOR MAINE JUDICIAL BRANCH ADR NEUTRALS (2001), 
available at http://www.courts.state.me.us/court_info/adr/pdf/code_of_conduct.pdf; Cassel v. 
Superior Ct., 51 Cal.4th 113 (Cal. 2011).  A discussion of the varying state principles around 
mediation confidentiality can be found in Richard C. Reuben & Nancy H. Rogers, Choppy Waters 
for a Movement Toward Uniform Confidentiality Privilege, 5 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 2 (1998). 
 38. See generally MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 16; see, e.g., Order Amending Foreclosure 
Mediation Rules, ADKT 435, NEV. S.C. R. 4(2) (2012) (explaining revised requirement that Nevada 
Foreclosure Mediation Program mediators comply with the Model Standards). 
 39. Many states or localities that have instituted foreclosure mediation programs have little or 
no experience with mediation.  For instance, Iowa offers some mediation programs in some 
localities, but has no statewide office or programs.  See generally Paul C. Gomez et al., Evaluation 
of the Iowa Alternative Dispute Resolution Programs, NAT’L CENTER FOR STATE COURTS (1998).  
Yet, Iowa was the first state to consider mediation as a way to assist the court’s foreclosure docket.  
Bob Brammer, Miller Organizes Mortgage Foreclosure Project to Prevent Flood of Foreclosures, 
IOWA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sept. 11, 2007), 
http://www.iowa.gov/government/ag/latest_news/releases/sept_2007/Foreclosure_Hotline.html.  
Some states with foreclosure mediation, including California and Florida, have extensive court-
connected mediation programs and supplemented existing programs with additional rules and staff to 
support adding foreclosure mediation.  See, e.g., Civil ADR / Alternative Dispute Resolution Options, 
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, 
http://www.sdcourt.ca.gov/portal/page?_pageid=55,1555034&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL 
7
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In 2009, Nevada’s legislature passed Assembly Bill 149, which created a 
statewide foreclosure mediation program to “address the foreclosure crisis 
head-on with the hope of keeping Nevada families in their homes.”40  Two 
months into the program, there were 1,171 mediations requests.41  Also, two 
months into the program, the Supreme Court was already exploring changes 
to the rules, prompted by Assemblywoman Barbara Buckley reporting that 
servicers were participating in “bad faith.”42 
Under the original program rules, the mediators could stop a mediation 
if they believed a party was acting in bad faith, but they could not issue a 
report to any entity about the quality of mediation participation.43  This was 
consistent with Nevada’s Rules Governing Alternative Dispute Resolution, 
which state that all oral or written communication in a mediation, other than 
an agreement, is confidential and a mediator cannot disclose those 
communications in a subsequent proceeding.44  But at the prompting of 
borrower advocates, including Assemblywoman Buckley, the Supreme Court 
changed the rule.  In 2010, the mediator gained the ability to report a 
servicer’s bad faith participation to the court and to make a recommendation 
for sanctions to the judge. 45   The Supreme Court also changed the 
confidentiality provision to allow for this reporting and to allow the use of 
any other documents or communication in mediation in a review of bad faith 
participation.46  While the parties could request that the judge adjudicate the 
 
(last visited June 3, 2014); What ADR Options are Available?, SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
COUNTY OF ALAMEDA,  https://apps2.alameda.courts.ca.gov/adr/Default.aspx (last visited June 3, 
2014); Earnestine Reshard, Florida Mediation & Arbitration Programs: A Compendium, FLORIDA 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION CENTER (2009-10), http://www.flcourts.org/core/fileparse.php/254/urlt/09-
10FYDRCCompendium.pdf. 
 40. STATE OF NEVADA FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAM, 
http://foreclosure.nevadajudiciary.us/ (last visited June 3, 2014). 
 41. Buck Wargo, Nevada’s Top Court Considers Rule Changes for Foreclosure Mediation, 
LAS VEGAS SUN (Sept. 18, 2009), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2009/sep/18/foreclosure-
mediation/. 
 42. Id.  Bad faith and good faith participation are difficult to define, as will be discussed later.  
It is often a subjective standard, meaning a person other than the parties must determine whether 
someone is participating in good faith.  This threatens the neutrality of the mediator, as the mediator 
becomes more of a judge than a neutral. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Order Adopting Rules Governing Alternative Dispute Resolution and Nevada Mediation 
Rules and Amending the Nevada Arbitration Rules and Nevada Short Trial Rules, § C, R. 11(A) 
(March 3, 2005), http://www.leg.state.nv.us/CourtRules/RGADR.html. 
 45. Nev. Assemb.  Bill 149(1)(5) (2009) (amended 2011), available at 
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/75th2009/Bills/AB/AB149_EN.pdf. 
 46. Nevada Supreme Court Order Adopting Foreclosure Mediation Rules R. 18 (amended 
Sept. 1, 2013), available at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/CourtRules/FMR.html. 
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issue of bad faith participation, the new rules stop short of allowing the 
parties to make a record from the mediation for this purpose.47 
In 2011, the Nevada Supreme Court took mediator reporting even 
further.  On July 7, 2011, the Court decided three cases about practices 
within the Nevada Mortgage Foreclosure Mediation Program.48  The cases 
involved borrowers who had exercised their right to request that a judge 
adjudicate the issue of a servicer’s bad faith participation.  In each case, the 
judge did not find the servicer’s actions49 rose to the level of bad faith.50  On 
appeal, the Court found the servicer’s actions did constitute bad faith,51 but 
the Court’s decision went even further.  Not only did the Court implicitly 
affirm that mediators may report on specific party behavior or 
communication that supports bad faith participation, but it also mandated 
that mediators recommend sanctions for those behaviors.52  The Court now 
requires judges to take the mediator’s report as conclusive evidence of bad 
faith participation and sanction parties accordingly.53 
Of course, mediation program administrators want to encourage party 
attendance and full participation; a mediation program with only one party 
or limited negotiation is no program at all.54  However, the requirement that 
judges must now comply with mediators, while in the interest of keeping 
 
 47. Austin Kilgore, Nevada Court Extends, Modifies Foreclosure Mediation Program, 
HOUSING WIRE (May 7, 2010), http://www.housingwire.com/2010/05/07/nevada-court-extends-
modifies-foreclosure-mediation-program. 
 48. Leyva v. Nat’l Default Serv. Corp., 255 P.3d 1275 (Nev. 2011) [hereinafter Leyva]; 
Pasillas v. HSBC Bank USA, 255 P.3d 1281 (Nev. 2011) [hereinafter Pasillas]; Redmon v. HomeQ 
Serv., Inc., No. 56358 (Jul. 7, 2011). 
 49. In Leyva, Wells Fargo, the servicer representative that appeared at mediation, did not 
submit copies of mortgage assignments, though Wells Fargo was not the original mortgage holder. 
Leyva, supra note 48, at *3-4.  In Pasillas, the servicer representative stated at mediation that it was 
not counsel for HSBC (the case’s named beneficiary of the mortgage note), which had erroneously 
been named trustee, but was counsel for American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc., which was 
responsible for the case.  Pasillas, supra note 48, at *5.  The mediator’s report also stated that the 
mortgage note was missing two pages and that the servicer had not conducted a complete appraisal.  
Id. 
 50. Leyva, supra note 48, at *4 (referring to the appellate court’s decision that Wells Fargo 
should not be sanctioned because it provided all essential documents); Pasillas, supra note 48, at *5 
(referring to the appellate court’s decision that respondents had “met the burden to show cause why 
sanctions should not lie”). 
 51. Leyva, supra note 48, at *14; Pasillas, supra note 48, at *8, 13. 
 52. Pasillas, supra note 48, at *7, 11. 
 53. Id. at *12, n. 10. 
 54. Adrienne L. Krikorian & Jeffrey A. Tidus, The Benefits of Active Party Participation in 
Mediation, MEDIATE.COM (Feb. 2002), http://www.mediate.com/articles/krikorian1.cfm. 
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parties accountable to the mediation program’s requirement, breaches the 
very core principles of mediation.  First, it jeopardizes the candor that 
confidential mediations are supposed to promote.  If a party believes the 
mediator will report what is said or done during the mediation, the party will 
be less likely to be candid about emotions, needs, and possible compromises.  
Second, the reporting requirement and judicial compliance turns the 
mediator into a non-neutral party.  The more determinations the mediator 
must make, the more the mediator looks and acts like a judge and the more 
mediation becomes an adjudicatory process.  Especially when the parties 
know the mediator’s word will be used to penalize them later, the parties 
will not be forthcoming about potential options for resolution.  
Unfortunately, a decision that intends to further the goals of the foreclosure 
mediation program—to ensure party participation in the process—actually 
degrades mediation’s core values and jeopardizes the very outcomes it seeks 
to achieve. 
B. Challenges in Implementing Mediation in the Foreclosure Context: 
Confidentiality and Accountability in Mediator Reports 
As the Nevada cases demonstrate, a primary challenge in designing 
foreclosure mediation programs is ensuring that both parties participate in 
good faith in a voluntary, confidential process with a trained neutral.55  There 
is an “inherent dissonance” between holding parties accountable for good 
faith participation and preserving confidentiality, as Professor Kristen 
Blankley recognized prior to the inception of foreclosure mediation 
programs.56  A mediation program that best incentivizes parties to work out 
solutions will find balanced ways to achieve these seemingly conflicting 
goals.57  This article provides some guidance regarding program design 
elements that can provide such balance. 
 
 55. See John Lande, Using Dispute System Design Methods to Promote Good-Faith 
Participation in Court-Connected Mediation Programs, 50 UCLA L. REV. 69, 78 (2002) (noting that 
without a “good faith” standard of some sort, participants may just “go through the motions” during 
the mediation or may try to take advantage of lesser-situated opponents) [hereinafter Lande]; see 
generally, Focus on Confidentiality in Mediation, 5 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 2 (1998), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/dispute_resolution_magazine_home/dispute_magazine_wi
n98.html [hereinafter Focus]. 
 56. Kristen Blankley, Confidentiality or Control: Which will Prevail as Confidentiality and 
“Good Faith” Negotiation Statutes Collide in Court-Annexed Mediations?, AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION (Nov. 30, 2004), http://www.abanet.org/dispute/essay/confidentialitycontrol.pdf. 
 57. Alon Cohen, Walk the Talk, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (2010), 
http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2010/11/pdf/walk_the_talk.pdf 
[hereinafter Walk the Talk]. 
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Mediation advocates, far before foreclosure mediation developed, have 
grappled with how to hold parties publicly accountable in a process that is 
otherwise private. 58   Attorney, arbitrator, and mediator Larry R. Rute 
thoroughly reviewed state cases and ethics opinions regarding 
confidentiality and good faith requirements, aptly highlighting the problems 
with either the court or the mediator defining and reporting on bad faith 
participation. 59  He concluded that improved “skill by the mediator and trust 
by the parties” might help to resolve conflicts. 60   Jeffrey W. Stempel 
similarly asserts that courts and mediators must rely on the assumption that 
parties want to mediate in good faith.61  Yet, Susan Schultz concludes that a 
requirement to determine bad faith behavior in mediation is nothing but “bad 
news with alarming consequences.”62  While both mediator skill and party 
trust are important aspects of mediation, they do not guarantee a mediation 
session will balance confidentiality with the interest in good faith 
participation. 
Foreclosure mediation programs cannot rely solely on voluntary 
compliance to ensure fair processes.63  However, particular dynamics with 
the larger foreclosure crisis 64  and borrower/servicer relationships 65  lead 
courts, borrower advocates, and even mediation advocates to call for 
program accountability measures66 that sometimes violate one or more core 
 
 58. See, e.g., Focus, supra note 55. 
 59. See generally Larry R. Rute, The Evolution of Commercial Mediation in the Midwest: Best 
Practices, Confidentiality and Good Faith, 79-JAN J. KAN. B.A. 24 (2010). 
 60. Id. at 29. 
 61. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Feeding the Right Wolf: A Niebuhrian Perspective on the 
Opportunities and Limits of Mindful Core Concerns Dispute Resolution, 10 NEV. L.J. 472 (2010). 
 62. Susan Schultz, Bad Faith Mediation; Bad News for Mediators, TEX. MEDIATOR (Winter 
2009). 
 63. See generally Geoffrey Walsh, State and Local Foreclosure Mediation Programs: Can 
They Save Homes?, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER (Sept. 2009), 
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_mortgage/mediation/report-state-mediation-
programs.pdf [hereinafter Walsh]. 
 64. See, e.g., Julie Haviv, U.S. Home Foreclosure Mediation in Jeopardy, REUTERS (Sept. 23, 
2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN2340194220090923. 
 65. Faces of the Home Foreclosure Crisis, WALL ST. J., 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704610904576031632838153532.html (last 
updated Dec. 29, 2010). 
 66. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, A Mortgage Nightmare’s Happy Ending, N.Y. TIMES, 
(Dec. 25, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/26/business/26mod.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&ref=foreclosures 
(citing Kurt Eggert, a professor at Chapman University School of Law); Walsh, supra note 63, at V, 
VII. 
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mediation values, if not mediation laws outright.  Thus, greater attention to 
foreclosure mediation’s goals and subsequent program design, especially per 
the role of the mediator, is needed. 
Though analysis of the foreclosure crisis, 67  and articles about 
foreclosure mediation, 68  are prolific, few scholars have explored how 
foreclosure mediation’s goals interact with mediation’s core principles, 
especially in light of the inherent dissonance between party behavioral 
accountability and confidentiality.69  Many programs cite more than one 
goal.70  Some seek to help borrowers and keep them in their homes.71  Others 
want to provide a forum for servicers and borrowers to meet face-to-face and 
discuss options, regardless of outcomes.72  Still others aim to ease the burden 
on overloaded court dockets by having other professionals—housing 
 
 67. See, e.g., Times Topics: Foreclosures (2012 Robosigning and Mortgage Servicing 
Settlement), N.Y. TIMES, 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/f/foreclosures/index.html?scp=1-
spot&sq=foreclosure&st=cse (last visited June 4, 2014). 
 68. See, e.g., Grace B. Pazdan, How Foreclosure Mediation Legislation Can Keep Vermonters 
in their Homes (and Money in the Pockets of Mortgage Holders), 36-SPG VT. B.J. 24 (Spring 2010) 
(summarizing the Vermont foreclosure mediation program and advocating that foreclosure 
mediation financially helps homeowners and lenders and criticizing the legislature’s decision to cut 
lender penalties for non-compliance with the mediation program); Stephen F.J. Ornstein, Matthew S. 
Yoon, & John P. Holahan, Florida Foreclosure Mediation Program, 64 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 
86 (Spring 2010) (outlining procedures for foreclosure mediation program); Madhawa Palihapitiya 
& Kaila Eisenkraft, A Study for the Design and Administration of the a Successful Foreclosure 
Mediation Program in Massachusetts, MASS. OFFICE PUB. COLLAB. (Feb. 2013), 
http://cdn.umb.edu/images/mopc/Foreclosure_mediation_program_study_FINAL.pdf. 
 69. See, e.g., Shana H. Khader, Mediating Mediations: Protecting the Homeowner’s Right to 
Self-Determination in Foreclosure Mediation Programs, 44 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 109 (2010) 
(clarifying the difference between official mediation and judicial settlement conferences in the 
foreclosure context, examining the power dynamic present in most foreclosure mediations, and 
identifying how foreclosure mediation programs can protect the homeowner’s right to self-
determination through legal consultation and document exchange safeguards). 
 70. See, e.g., Supreme Court of Nevada, About the Program, STATE OF NEVADA, 
http://foreclosure.nevadajudiciary.us/index.php/about-program (last visited June 4, 2014) (stating 
Nevada’s goals are “to help keep families in their homes . . . and to provide] an opportunity for 
homeowners and lenders to discuss alternatives to foreclosure.”). 
 71. See, e.g., Press Release from Anne Milgram, N.J. Att’y Gen., Statewide Mortgage 
Foreclosure Mediation Program Launched (Jan. 9, 2009), 
http://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases09/pr20090109a.html (last visited June 4, 2014).  This goal is an 
interesting one for the mediation community to address, since mediation processes traditionally do 
not assist only one party or aim for a particular outcome.  While this “tension” is prevalent in the 
foreclosure context and worth exploring, the scope of this paper does not cover this question. 
 72. See, e.g., State of Connecticut Judicial Branch, Attorney Frequently Asked Questions, 
FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAM, http://www.jud.state.ct.us/foreclosure/attorney_qs.htm (last 
visited June 4, 2014); S.C. of Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC09-54, 2 (Dec. 28, 2009), Final Report 
and Recommendations on Residential Mortgage Foreclosure Cases, S.C. of Florida Admin. Order 
No. AOSC09-54, 2 (Dec. 28, 2009), available at 
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/clerk/adminorders/2009/AOSC09-54.pdf. 
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counselors, attorneys, and mediators—assist the court. 73   Some policy 
makers cite the “deleterious effects” continued foreclosures will have on the 
state economy because they inspire so many state programs.74  And some 
borrower advocates involved in program creation explicitly say the 
mediations are meant to hold servicers accountable for “bad” practices.75 
Below, I contrast these foreclosure mediation76 goals and accountability 
measures—some of which are new to the mediation world—with the 
priorities and rules under which court-connected mediation historically 
operates. 
III.  COURT-CONNECTED FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAM  
MEASURES OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
A. Party Participants and Foreclosure Mediation Goals 
Foreclosure mediation program structures vary greatly from state to 
state and within each city.77  Generally, a foreclosure mediation program 
consists of a program manager that schedules and organizes the mediation 
session, neutrals that facilitate discussion,78 and mediation participants.  In 
 
 73. See Greg Allen, Mediation Courts May Ease Foreclosure Backlog, NATIONAL PUBLIC 
RADIO (Apr. 6, 2009), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=102795312&ft=1&f=102795312. 
 74. S.B. 1137 § 1(d), 2007-2008 Leg. (Ca. 2008), available at 
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/sen/sb_1101-1150/sb_1137_bill_20100924_chaptered.pdf. 
 75. See, e.g., Wendy Innes & Andrew White, CT Foreclosure Filings Up, Many Stuck in 
Mediation, HARTFORD GUARDIAN (May 29, 2010), http://www.thehartfordguardian.com/?p=4808.  
Mediation as punishment denigrates the mediation process and threatens core assumptions like 
impartiality and self-determination.  See MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 16, at 3,4. 
 76. To illustrate the use of the principles of “authority,” “accountability,” “participation,” and 
“good faith” in the mortgage foreclosure context, I cite state programs that use the term “mediation” 
or that the federal government has included under the umbrella of “foreclosure mediation,” though to 
traditional court-connected mediation personnel, the program may not conform to a traditional 
mediation format.  See, e.g., U.S. Department of House and Urban Development & Department of 
Justice, Emerging Strategies for Effective Foreclosure Mediation Programs 7 (Nov. 2010). 
 77. For a description of all programs in existence as of July 19, 2011, see Models, supra note 
26. 
 78. The people that serve as mediators vary among programs.  Some have an extensive list of 
paid mediators from which to draw.  Others operate solely with volunteers.  Some programs require 
mediators to have extensive mediation experience before practicing in the foreclosure context.  Other 
programs require no special training for mediators.  Some programs specifically cite mediator ethical 
guidelines to be followed during the process.  Others require mediators to violate the very 
professional guidelines to which the mediators must adhere. 
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all programs, participants include the borrower and a representative for the 
servicer.  The representative may be an attorney for the servicer, an 
employee of the servicer’s mediation or loss mitigation department, a 
servicer employee with greater responsibilities, or some combination of the 
three.  Other participants may be housing counselors and attorneys to assist 
borrowers in preparing for, and participating in, the process.79 
These participants have a variety of goals, both stated and unstated, that 
drive their desire to uphold or reject certain accountability measures.  
Borrower advocates want mediation programs to create protective measures 
barring sophisticated parties from using the confidential process to abuse 
less sophisticated litigants.80  Banks want to hold borrowers accountable for 
the contracts they signed.81  Investors want to hold banks accountable for 
returning the most possible on their mortgage-backed securities. 82  
Borrowers want to hold banks accountable for good communication 
practices, including communications about their loans and potential 
modification options.83  Borrower advocates want to hold banks accountable 
for proving ownership of the mortgage debt84 and providing transparent loan 
modification processes, specifically, HAMP.85  And courts or government 
agencies in twenty-six states (at time of this writing), attempting to 
ameliorate the effects of the foreclosure crisis, believe that foreclosure 
mediation programs can heed these demands.86 
 
 79. See Resolution Systems Institute, Foreclosure Mediation Funding Executive Summary , 
RESOLUTION SYSTEMS INSTITUTE (Jan. 26, 2011), 
http://courtadr.org/files/ForeclosureMediationFundingExecSummary.pdf (highlighting that almost 
half of programs require borrowers meet with a housing counselor before mediation and few 
programs provide an attorney to borrowers). 
 80. Maureen A. Weston, Checks on Participant Conduct in Compulsory ADR: Reconciling the 
Tension in the Need for Good-Faith Participation, Autonomy, and Confidentiality, 76 IND. L.J. 591, 
597–603 (2001); Kimberlee K. Kovach, Good Faith in Mediation—Requested, Recommended, or 
Required? A New Ethic, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 575, 604 (1997) [hereinafter Kovach]. 
 81. Yesner & Boss, Homeowners Turn to Mediators for Relief, P.L BLOG (June 4, 2010), 
http://www.yesnerboss.com/2010/06/homeowners-turn-to-mediation-for-relief.html. 
 82. Al Yoon & Jeff Mason, Investors, White House Press Banks over Mortgages, REUTERS 
(Oct. 19, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE69I54T20101019. 
 83. Jacob Adelman, Homeowners Say Loan Modifications, Balky Banks, Led Them to 
Foreclosure, ASSOCIATED. PRESS (Nov. 7, 2010), 
http://www.cleveland.com/nation/index.ssf/2010/11/homeowners_say_loan_modificati.html. 
 84. Jason Hidalgo, Real Estate: Foreclosure Fraud Law Takes Effect on Saturday, RENO 
GAZETTE J. (Sept. 30, 2011), http://dcmetro-homemarket.com/bankownedhouses/354/real-estate-
foreclosure-fraud-law-takes-effect-on-saturday-reno-gazette/. 
 85. AMI SHAH & KATIE GOTTSCHALL-DONOHUE, SERVICER ACCOUNTABILITY INITIATIVE 
FINAL REPORT: DECEMBER 2009 – SEPTEMBER 2010, HOUSING ACTION ILL. 1 (2010), available at 
http://www.housingactionil.org/downloads/SAI_FINAL_REPORT.pdf [hereinafter SHAH]. 
 86. See generally Models, supra note 26. 
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A recent federal government report highlights “strategies that promote 
successful outcomes” in foreclosure mediation programs.  The report 
promotes including “accountability measures” in foreclosure mediation 
program rules.87  The report cites three programs—Maine, Rhode Island, and 
Vermont—that provide means to hold parties accountable to participating in 
the mediation process to some degree.  Other programs not mentioned in the 
report also have means for holding parties accountable.88  The types of 
actions holding parties accountable lie on a continuum, from most objective 
(Element 1) to most subjective (Element 3). 
Element 1a Accountability: Attendance 
Most foreclosure mediation programs have some requirement that both 
servicer counsel and borrower attend the mediation, whether or not they 
speak during the session.  Attendance may mean physical presence in a 
mediation room, or in some cases, one or both sides may attend 
telephonically or through video conference.89 
In Florida’s First, Eleventh, and Nineteenth Circuits, the mediator is 
responsible for reporting the attendance of both the borrower and the 
servicer’s representative (an attorney).  The administrative orders allow the 
court to impose sanctions if the servicer does not appear for the mediation.  
Options for sanctions are a fine or dismissal of the case.90  The Maine 
 
 87. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV. & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EMERGING STRATEGIES FOR 
EFFECTIVE FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS 7 (2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atj/effective-mediation-prog-strategies.pdf. 
 88. Administrative Order Establishing Foreclosure Mediation Pilot Project, Administrative 
Order No. 2009-00001, No. D-0101-CV-77-52749, N.M. First Jud. Dist. Ct. (2009), available at 
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_mortgage/foreclosure_med_prog_by_state/nm_admin_
order.pdf (sanctions in New Mexico); S.B. 651, 26th Leg. § 667-L(b) (Haw. 2011), available at  
http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/session2011/Bills/SB651_CD1_.PDF (sanctions in Hawaii include 
fines and a stay of foreclosure); H.B. 1362, 62nd Leg., Reg. Sess., Sec. 7 (11) (Wash. 2011), 
available at http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2011-12/PDF/Bills/House%20Bills/1362-
S2.pdf (Washington State’s foreclosure mediation program allows borrowers to use a mediator’s 
certificate of non-compliance by the servicer as a defense to the foreclosure). 
 89. See, e.g., S.B. 651, 26th Leg. § 667-L(b) (Haw. 2011), available at  
http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/session2011/Bills/SB651_CD1_.PDF (describing how Hawaii allows 
a servicer representative to attend telephonically after receiving permission from the mediator and 
the borrower). 
 90. See, e.g., Amended Administrative Order Governing Mandatory Circuit Court Mediation 
for Owner-Occupied Residential Mortgage Foreclosures, 2009-02-01, 4 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2009), 
available at http://ninja9.org/adminorders/orders/2009-02-01%20-
%20amended%20residential%20foreclosure%20to%20mediation%20orange%20county.pdf. 
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foreclosure mediation statute allows the court more flexibility.  The judge 
may determine “appropriate sanctions” for a party’s non-attendance.91  At 
least one Vermont court has sanctioned a servicer for not appearing for 
mediation by ordering the servicer to participate and tolling all fees incurred 
on the mortgage debt after the order for mediation was issued.92 
Element 1b Accountability: Attendance with Authority93 
Nevada requires a somewhat higher level of accountability.  There, a 
party not only must attend, but also must have the authority to modify the 
loan.  The servicer, rather than the mediator, files a certificate of compliance 
with mediation, stating that the servicer attended and participated in good 
faith.  The mediator must report if the servicer does not have a representative 
authorized to modify the loan available during the mediation.94 
Element 2 Accountability: Document Exchange 
Managing document exchange is at the heart of making the foreclosure 
mediation process efficient and effective, as most discussions between a 
borrower and servicer eventually explore the option of a loan modification.  
Without proper documents from the borrower, the servicer cannot evaluate a 
borrower for a loan modification.95  Some courts require the servicer to 
submit documents proving the servicer has the right to foreclose on the 
mortgage debt or other documents that may assist the mediation process.96  
Most foreclosure mediation programs require one or both parties to send 
documents relevant to a loan modification to the other prior to the mediation 
session.  Some will not conduct mediation before the servicer reviews loan 
modification documents and issues a written decision. 
 
 91. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6321-A (2009). 
 92. Citibank v. Mumley, No. S1087-09 CnC, 2011 WL 8472914 (Vt. Super. Ct. Sept. 1, 2011). 
 93. Because attendance with authority is a different requirement than simply having a 
representative attend mediation, I separate these types of attendance.  See, e.g., James R. Madison, 
Everything You Need to Know About Authority to Settle a Mediation, 63 DISP. RESOL. J. 20 (2008). 
 94. NEV. SUP. CT. FORECLOSURE MEDIATION R. (2009), available at 
http://www.nevadajudiciary.us/images/foreclosure/adkt435_amendedrules.pdf. 
 95. Thomas B. Scheffey, Young Solo Helps Family Avoid Foreclosure Through Mediation, 
CONN. L. TRIB., Apr. 6, 2011, http://www.cjdonlinesq.com/connecticut-foreclosure-mediation-
attorney.html. 
 96. See, e.g., McLean v. JP Morgan Chase Bank Nat’l Ass’n., 79 So. 3d 170 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2012) (reversing the decision to grant summary judgment to Chase and ordering Chase to 
submit proper documentation of its ability to foreclose); Diane C. Lade, Foreclosure Crisis: Lenders 
Holding Back Critical Information at Mediations, SUN SENTINEL, Mar. 3, 2011, http://articles.sun-
sentinel.com/2011-03-03/business/fl-mediation-documents-20110302_1_mediations-margery-
golant-foreclosure-defense-attorneys. 
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For example, both Providence, Rhode Island’s and Vermont’s 97 
programs require servicers to provide written documentation for the reasons 
a loan modification was denied.  In Vermont, the borrower must make a 
good faith effort to provide any information required by the Home 
Affordable Modification Program (HAMP)98 to the mediator at least 20 days 
prior to mediation.99  Similarly, the servicer must share with the borrower 
and the mediator what modification options the servicer is considering and 
the reasons for certain determinations.100  If the servicer states that an 
investor agreement, called a pooling and servicing agreement, prohibits 
modification, the servicer must produce a copy of the agreement. 101  
Importantly, all exchanged documents shall be confidential and shall not be 
included in the mediator’s report.102  There is no mechanism for the mediator 
to report good faith participation. 
In Providence, the Conciliation Coordinator103 must file a Certificate of 
Compliance after determining whether both parties participated in the 
Conciliation Conference and cooperated in the process.104  The Certificate 
includes an explanation of how both parties made a “good faith effort” to 
reach an agreement.105  To describe this effort, the Conciliation Coordinator 
collects information about the efforts of both parties from the parties 
themselves.106 
 
 97. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4632 (2009). 
 98. Under HAMP, lenders are required to solicit eligible borrowers who are more than thirty-
one days past due on their mortgage for a loan modification.  SHAH, supra note 85.  Eligible 
borrowers are homeowners who took out their primary residence’s current mortgage on or before 
January 1, 2009, who are experiencing financial hardship, who owe less than $729, 750 on their 
current mortgage, and who have current mortgage payments at least 32% of gross income.  See 
Home Affordable Modification Program, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE, 
http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/programs/lower-payments/Pages/hamp.aspx (last updated 
May 28, 2013) (click on “Eligibility” bar). 
 99. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 4633(b) (2009). 
 100. Id. at § 4633(a)(1). 
 101. Id. at § 4633(a)(3). 
 102. Id.  
 103. The third party in Providence’s Conciliation Conferences is a HUD counselor not bound 
by professional mediation rules.  CITY OF PROVIDENCE, FORECLOSURE CONCILIATION 
REQUIREMENT, DUTIES OF PARTICIPANTS, APPLYING THE ORDINANCE, MODEL CERTIFICATIONS 4 
(2009), available at http://cityof.providenceri.com/efile/230. 
 104. Id.  
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 5. 
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Element 3 Accountability: Good Faith Participation 
In Maine’s program, the court has the authority to assess costs and fees 
to either party failing to make a good faith effort in mediation sessions.107  
The requirement for parties to participate in good faith comes from Maine’s 
Court Alternative Dispute Resolution Service Rule: “Each party and their 
attorney . . . shall make a good faith effort to mediate all disputed issues.”108  
The party, through the court (or through a Non-Compliance Report), may 
motion for sanctions if anyone violates any part of the Rule, including the 
“good faith effort” requirement. 109   In some types of cases, e.g., 
landlord/tenant, the court must hold a hearing to determine if the parties 
mediated in good faith before hearing the merits of the case, regardless of 
whether the parties allege bad faith.110  In foreclosure cases, as part of the 
mediation report, the mediator “may notify the court if, in the mediator’s 
opinion, either party failed to negotiate in good faith.”111  Maine has not 
adopted the Uniform Mediation Act, which would bar the mediator from 
making such reports.112 
Interestingly, Washington has adopted the Uniform Mediation Act and 
its foreclosure mediation law still requires the mediator to report to the 
Department of Commerce whether the parties participated in good faith.113  
This report features a series of boxes the mediator can check to indicate what 
action of the borrower or servicer constituted a failure to mediate in good 
faith.  Actions include lack of timely or accurate provision of documents, 
failure to timely appear, representation without authority to make a binding 
decision, and failure to pay a fee.  Mediators may report all of these 
objective actions under the UMA.  The Washington mediator’s report also 
allows the mediator to include an attachment that describes “additional 
details of the mediation session.”114  This descriptive paragraph would 
 
 107. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6321-A(12) (2009). 
 108. ME. R. CIV. P. 92(b)(5)(E). 
 109. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6321-A(12) (2009). 
 110. Id. at § 6004-A (2007). 
 111. Id. at § 6321-A(13) (2009). 
 112. However, the Reporter’s Notes states that the privilege rule was based on the UMA.  ME. 
R. EVID. 514 advisory committee note (2009). 
 113. H.B. 1362, 62nd Leg., Reg. Sess. Sec. 7(9)(d) (Wash. 2011), available at 
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2011-12/Pdf/Bills/Session%20Laws/House/1362-
S2.SL.pdf. 
 114. State of Washington Department of Commerce, Foreclosure Mediation Report, available 
at http://qa.commerce.wa.gov/Documents/Foreclosure%20Cert%20of%20Mediation%20form.xls) 
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almost inevitably include subjective determinations from the mediator that 
would violate the state’s UMA law.115 
IV. ACCOUNTABILITY MEASURES AND CORE MEDIATION PRINCIPLES 
A. Balancing Values 
Throughout these varied practices, the same thread of questions 
remains: for what, and to whom, does the program want the participants to 
be accountable?  Showing up?  Prompt communication before and during 
the mediation?  Fair participation in the process?  Polite treatment of the 
other side?  Exploring every possible option? 
It seems like courts’ and legislatures’ vigor around accountability stems 
mainly from frustration, and sometimes anger, with the radical increase in 
foreclosures and the subsequent debacles related to the increase.116  Servicers 
had to rapidly ramp up foreclosure processes, increasing stress on the near-
collapsed banks’ recently stabilized resources.117  People facing foreclosure 
often feel confused or deceived, because of complicated bank loans or 
subprime mortgage scams.118  Some borrower advocates call for “holding 
servicers’ feet to the fire” and the “imposition of significant obligations” on 
the servicers to correct the perceived deception.119  Some even call for the 
states to use their police power to enforce these obligations in mediations.120 
 
 115. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.07.060 (2005), available at 
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=7.07.060. 
 116. See, e.g., U.S. Home Foreclosure Mediation in Jeopardy, REUTERS, Sept. 23, 2009, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN2340194220090923. 
 117. See Nelson D. Schwartz, Voices of Foreclosure Speak Daily About Desperation and 
Misery, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2010, B1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/16/business/economy/16foreclose.html?_r=1&ref=mortgages. 
 118. Faces of the Home-Foreclosure Crisis, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 2010, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704610904576031632838153532.html. 
 119. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, A Mortgage Nightmare’s Happy Ending, N.Y. Times, Dec. 
26, 2010, at BU1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/26/business/26mod.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&ref=foreclosures 
(citing Kurt Eggert, a professor at Chapman University School of Law); Walsh, supra note 63, at V). 
 120. See, e.g., Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the States should enact 
a temporary moratorium on residential mortgage foreclosures,  H.R. Res. 181, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 
2009), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c111:H.RES.181:# (recommending states 
use their police power to stop foreclosures, since the foreclosure crisis creates a state of emergency 
in some areas). 
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Emotional reactions to perceived injustice are often the catalyst for 
policy change.  But this anger should not lead to knee-jerk program design—
policy in action—that foregoes the basic principles of mediation, even if 
those principles are sometimes held in tension.  In some cases, the desire for 
methods to mitigate foreclosure has turned mediation into a non-neutral 
space.  Mediators sometimes make judgments about the parties, which not 
only threatens the confidentiality of the mediation, but also changes the 
mediator’s role from a third party neutral to an adjudicator.  Some programs 
have even articulated “continuing mediation” as one of the sanctions for bad 
faith participation in mediations. 121   Contrary to what some housing 
advocates believe, requiring the mediator to report about party behavior may 
discourage, rather than encourage, parties from fully disclosing settlement 
options.122 
Still, advocates for those who enter the court system without a 
sophisticated understanding of the process make good points about 
mediation needing protective measures to bar sophisticated parties from 
using an unregulated process to abuse pro se litigants.123  Others rightly point 
out that borrowers can use mediation to draw out the foreclosure process.124  
Programs cannot rely solely on voluntary compliance with their 
accountability measures to result in fair processes.125 
How can foreclosure mediation programs ensure equal bargaining and 
worthwhile party participation without negatively altering the role of the 
mediator and thus, undermining the benefits of mediation?  A program must 
respond to these needs in a way that encourage balanced, self-determined 
solutions.126  A description of tensions programs face and suggestions of 
balanced solutions are below. 
 
 121. See Mortgage Foreclosure Mediation R. (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2010) (draft) (on file with author). 
 122. The National Consumer Law Center advocates that, to “increase homeowner participation” 
in the mediation process, courts should: “3. Stay all foreclosure proceedings until a mediator or court 
determines that the servicer has complied in good faith with all participation obligations; 4. Provide 
for direct court supervision over the enforcement of servicer obligations to mediate, including the 
imposition of sanctions when necessary. Sanctions must include dismissal of judicial foreclosure 
actions and orders barring non-judicial proceedings.”  Walsh, supra note 63, at vii. 
 123. Weston, supra note 80, at 597–603; Kovach, supra note 80, at 604. 
 124. Kenneth R. Gosselin, Distressed Homeowners in Mediation Get Reprieve from 
Foreclosure Litigation, HARTFORD COURANT, June 9, 2011, http://articles.courant.com/2011-06-
09/business/hc-foreclosure-bill-0610-20110609_1_mediation-program-foreclosure-proceedings-
bank-lobbyists. 
 125. Walsh, supra note 63, at v. 
 126. Walk the Talk, supra note 57. 
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Element 1 Accountability: Attendance 
Having both parties attend mediation is an obvious prerequisite to 
working out an agreement.  Attendance can mean a variety of things.  Some 
programs require servicer executives to be present for the mediation, while 
others allow all servicer representatives, including counsel, to participate 
telephonically.127  Some programs hold an initial conference with a mediator 
or judge in which only the borrower must be present. 128   In these 
conferences, a judge or mediator reviews a borrower’s case to determine 
whether it is appropriate to send to mediation.  Only then can a borrower 
schedule a meeting with the servicer. 
In most foreclosure mediation programs, if parties do not attend, the 
case can get dismissed or remanded for the judge to make a determination, 
or the judge can sanction the party who did not attend.129  Although the 
Federal Housing Finance Agency, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal 
Housing Authority already require servicers to pursue loss mitigation with 
borrowers, a mediator can observe people participating in a process in 
furtherance of loss mitigation and report on that attendance, which the UMA 
permits.130  Then, the court or other program administrator can hold people 
accountable for their attendance. 
Some problems with attendance requirements occur when parties have 
unexpected life events that threaten their attendance.  Cars break down, 
snowstorms prevent safe travel, babysitters cancel, other clients require 
immediate attention.  Both parties face these events: borrowers and 
servicers.  Dismissing a case for one missed mediation seems like a 
punishment too great for the crime.  Yet, every missed mediation increases 
 
 127. Compare e.g., Administrative Order No. 10-18: Residential Mortgage Foreclosure 
Mandatory Mediation Program (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2010), available at 
http://www.willcountycourts.com/images/stories/WillCounty/mediationadminorder.pdf, with U.S. 
BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY, LOSS MITIGATION PROGRAM AND PROCEDURES 
VIII(B) (2011), available at 
http://www.njb.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/downloads/2011_07_29_Loss_Mitigation_Program_a
nd_Procedures_7-28-11.pdf. 
 128. See, e.g., MCLEAN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE 
MANDATORY MEDIATION PROGRAM RULES 3(I), available at  
http://www.mcleancountyil.gov/documentcenter/view/1691. 
 129. Brett Goodman, Can a Court Impose Sanctions for Failing to Appear at Court-Ordered 
Mediation?, MEDIATE.COM, June 2011, 
http://www.mediate.com//articles/GoodmanBbl20110605.cfm. 
 130. UMA § 7(b). 
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administration costs and delays the negotiation and settlement of a 
foreclosure case, sometimes by months. 
Not only do the parties need to attend the mediation, but the right parties 
need to attend a mediation for any agreement to result.  If a party does not 
have the authority to settle, the mediation is nothing more than a discussion 
about what could be.131  In the foreclosure mediation context, counsel or loss 
mitigation personnel, who may not know much about the specific 
foreclosure case, represent servicers.  Attorneys often have “settlement 
authority” from their clients up to a certain dollar amount.  In the foreclosure 
context, this could mean that the servicer has only authorized the servicer’s 
attorney to make one or two alternative offers to foreclosure.  This frustrates 
mediation processes that seek to explore “all [available] options.”132  It also 
frustrates a borrower who educated herself about potential resolution options 
and planned for how she could meet each.  It even frustrates the servicer’s 
attorney, who may not know any more about the situation than the two pages 
of authorization paperwork her client gave her.  Some programs require that 
the parties with full settlement authority attend to avoid having mediation 
participants with little knowledge of their client or what the client can do.133 
Having servicers present seems like it would alleviate much anxiety in 
the process.  Yet, requiring a servicer with full settlement authority to attend 
would be challenging.  Servicers with greater authority are often hundreds, if 
not thousands, of miles from the bank that made the loan.  Even the servicer 
employees who do attend by phone are often only able to speak about a 
limited scope of options.  They have to refer a mediation session to another 
division to discuss a different option. 134   With foreclosure mediation 
programs springing up around the country, this would mean that servicers 
would have to employ thousands more representatives to travel to each 
mediation.  Programs already have trouble getting enough mediators and 
legal aid attorneys.  The administrative nightmare that could ensue would 
extend the foreclosure process far beyond the already-long 438 day 
average.135 
 
 131. Madison, supra note 93. 
 132. Walsh, supra note 63, at 19. 
 133. See, e.g., C.P. CUYOGA COUNTY, FORECLOSURE MEDIATION CASE MANAGEMENT 
DIRECTIVE III(b)(i) (2008), available at 
http://cp.cuyahogacounty.us/internet/CourtDocs/Fore_Med_CMD.pdf. 
 134. For instance, one department may deal with HAMP and one may manage in-house 
modifications. 
 135. This number represents the number of days between a homeowner defaulting on a loan and 
a homeowner being evicted from the home.  Lengthening Limbo, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2010, 
available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/imagepages/2010/06/01/business/01nopayGrfx.html?ref=business.  This 
timeline is shorter or longer depending on the state, the circuit, and the number of foreclosures in the 
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Ensuring the appearance of responsible parties is difficult because of 
mortgage-backed securities.136  During the real estate boom of the mid-
2000s, banks sold mortgages to pooling agents (government and private).  
Then, the agent bundled the mortgages into securitized interests.  Investors 
purchased the bundles and received an agent-backed security guaranteeing 
the investor a share of all principal and interest payments made in return.  
So, if a home in one of these mortgage-backed security pools goes into 
foreclosure, the investors have some authority to make demands for 
payment.  Requiring all investors in a mortgage to come to the mediation 
table would be like requiring all stockholders of a large company to vote at 
every stockholder meeting. 
Some mediation advocates claim that letting a responsible party send a 
lawyer instead of appearing in person compromises the ability to explore all 
options in mediation.  However, it may be better to settle for a representative 
with limited authority with access to people with greater authority than to 
make demands for persons with authority who may not add much to the 
mediation session. 
Element 2 Accountability: Documentation Exchange 
Requiring both parties to have documents ready for the mediation is a 
worthwhile prerequisite.  Document review and exchange constitutes much 
of the mediation time before servicers can consider a loan modification.  
Indeed, borrowers not having the correct or updated documentation or 
servicers not processing submitted applications in time cause mediations to 
roll over into a second session or beyond.137  However, there are two major 
reasons against program administrators making bad faith judgments if 
 
area.  See, e.g., New Hampshire, Foreclosure Timeline, Help for New Hampshire Homeowners, 
http://www.homehelpnh.org/understanding-your-situation/the-foreclosure-process/ (last visited June 
2, 2014), compare with Cleveland, The Foreclosure Timeline, The Federal Reserve Bank of 
Cleveland, Dec. 12, 2009, http://www.clevelandfed.org/Forefront/2009/12/ff_20091216_08.cfm.  
For an extensive discussion on timelines and how they impact foreclosures, see Amy Crews Cutts & 
William A. Merrill, Interventions in Mortgage Default: Policies and Practices to Prevent Home 
Loss and Lower Costs, Freddie Mac Working Paper #08-01(2008), available at 
http://www.freddiemac.com/news/pdf/interventions_in_mortgage_default.pdf.  Note that this 
resource does not account for how mediations lengthen or shorten foreclosure timelines. 
 136. Mortgage-Backed Securities, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/mortgagesecurities.htm (last visited June. 2, 2014). 
 137. Walk the Talk, supra note 57, at 15. 
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parties fail to submit a certain list of documents prior to the mediation or 
bring them to the mediation.138 
First, borrowers and servicers frequently lose or misplace documents.139  
The reasons could be as simple as dealing with a mass of paperwork or as 
complicated as not having the educational background to understand what 
bank paperwork is important.  While losing the paperwork intentionally may 
be grounds for sanctions, parties should not always face sanctions. 140  
Borrowers already express hesitation at turning over paperwork in a process 
they are not sure is confidential.141  Sanctions would discourage the parties 
from participating at all if they feared they did not have the right 
paperwork.142  Sanctions would also stall parties from working on a main 
goal of mediation: improved communication.  Facilitating clear 
communication about paperwork is a primary, positive outcome of 
foreclosure mediation. 
Second, servicers’ attorneys have repeatedly emphasized that they 
cannot get their clients to provide a standardized list of documents needed 
for loan modifications, even modifications that are federally-managed, like 
HAMP.143  Because servicers change their qualification criteria frequently, 
and each servicer has its own loan modification programs, a consistent list 
would be nearly impossible.  Additionally, a borrower’s circumstances may 
lead to different document requests; for example, a self-employed person 
must submit different documentation than someone with a direct deposit 
from an employer.  Thus, the program would have to create its own list, 
which would be neither complete nor sufficient for what the servicers 
actually need.  Such endeavors would waste precious mediation time. 
Some advocates want to, and some courts do, require servicers to 
provide borrowers with written documentation of how the servicers calculate 
net present value, what the pooling and servicing agreement says, or what 
 
 138. Nevada’s program allows for a finding of bad faith if either party does not provide 
necessary documents.  See, e.g., Supreme Court of Nevada, Questions, STATE OF NEVADA, 
http://foreclosure.nevadajudiciary.us/index.php/questions (last visited June 8, 2014). 
 139. See, e.g., SHAH, supra note 85, at 11. 
 140. Alon Cohen, Clearing the Foreclosure Crisis: Foreclosure Mediation Can Reduce 
Uncertainty, Center for Am. Progress, Oct. 25, 2010, 
http://americanprogress.org/issues/housing/news/2010/10/25/8565/clearing-the-foreclosure-crisis-
foreclosure-mediation-can-reduce-uncertainty/. 
 141. See Kimberly Miller, Foreclosure Mediation Suffers from Lack of Information, 
Preparation, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 4, 2011, http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2011-01-
04/news/os-foreclosures-mediation-report-20110103_1_alternative-dispute-resolution-rules-
foreclosure-mediation-mediation-program. 
 142. Walk the Talk, supra note 57, at 16. 
 143. Meeting with Anonymous Lenders’ Attorneys (2010) (on file with author). 
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formulation(s) the servicer uses to consider loan modifications.144  These 
requirements would certainly make the foreclosure and modification process 
more transparent, which is one of the goals of mediation.  However, for 
some of these documents, like the pooling and servicing agreement, the 
servicer must request the investors to authorize those disclosures.  Such 
authorization would be on a case-by-case basis, thus extending the 
foreclosure process even further.  In many instances, the borrower would 
neither understand what the pooling and servicing agreement is, nor how it 
would help her case (and in most instances, having the document would not 
help her case). 
Further, the mediator should not be in a position to explain, let alone 
evaluate, any paperwork. 145   This practice morphs mediation, which 
preserves the role of a third party as the neutral, into arbitration, which 
involves a third party as an adjudicator.146 
The mediator also should not report her opinion about the loan 
modification process.147  A mediation is not about deciding right and wrong, 
but about parties exploring options for a self-determined resolution.148  Thus, 
the mediator can help facilitate explanation (by asking questions), but should 
not be advising the borrower or reviewing paperwork for its completeness.  
If program managers determine it is more important to explore whether 
mortgage procedures were correct than to settle the case at hand, the 
program should direct parties to an adjudicative process first.149 
 
 144. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6321-A(13) (2009) (requiring the mediator’s 
report to include the outcome of the Net Present Value worksheet); Walsh, supra note 63, at Vi; see 
also Katie Buitrago, New Bill Could Improve Accuracy and Fairness of Foreclosure Process, 
WOODSTOCK INSTITUTE, Dec. 1, 2010, http://www.woodstockinst.org/blog/2010/new-bill-could-
improve-accuracy-and-fairness-foreclosure-process [hereinafter New Bill]. 
 145. Contra Walsh, supra note 63, at 11. 
 146. Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Mediation: The ‘New Arbitration’ 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 
61 (2012), available at http://www.hnlr.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/61-96.pdf. 
 147. Contra Walsh, supra note 63, at 11;  
An Act To Preserve Home Ownership and Stabilize the Economy by Preventing Unnecessary 
Foreclosures, H.P. 994, L.D. 1418, 124th Leg., §§ 3, 13 (Me. 2009) (amending Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
tit. 14, § 6321-A (2009)). 
 148. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 16. 
 149. See infra Part V (discussing how a program can check for homeowner defenses and still 
maintain a mediation program’s core values). 
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Element 3 Accountability: Good Faith Participation 
In 2009, the National Consumer Law Center published a report that, 
among other reforms, called for accountability measures to ensure consumer 
protection from bad bank behavior in foreclosure mediation programs.  The 
recommendation was to have the mediator report on bad behavior and 
recommend punishment for the bank.150  While this may seem extreme to 
long-time mediators, the Nevada case indicates that these roles may become 
more and more common for mediators.  But, as Blankley, Stempel, and 
Lande, among others, have pointed out, a mediator being responsible for 
ensuring good faith participation and for upholding core mediation 
principles creates inherent dissonance.151  In effect, the requirements create 
more than inherent dissonance; they quite simply degrade the fabric of 
confidentiality, neutrality, and self-determination that renders mediation a 
beneficial alternative to traditional conflict resolution settings. 
B. Confidentiality 
Some programs have created a “certificate of compliance” for mediators 
to report whether the parties operated in good faith throughout the mediation 
process.152  If program rules state the value of all parties participating in 
good faith, the program will need a mechanism to enforce such provisions.  
Values without teeth do not operate as values at all. 
Confidentiality is also often prescribed in a local rule,153 state statute,154 
or professional standard.155  It is also preserved in the Uniform Mediation 
Act (UMA) and thus, applies in states that have adopted the UMA.156  A 
 
 150. Walsh, supra note 63.. 
 151. Alexandria Zylstra, The Road from Voluntary Mediation to Mandatory Good Faith 
Requirements: A Road Best Left Untraveled, 17 J. AMER. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 69 (2001), 
available at http://www.aaml.org/sites/default/files/the%20road%20from%20voluntary-
mediation.pdf. 
 152. See, e.g., STATE OF OREGON, FORECLOSURE AVOIDANCE MEDIATION PROGRAM 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE (2012), available at 
http://www.doj.state.or.us/consumer/pdf/foreclosure_mediation_certificate_of_compliance.pdf. 
 153. MO. SUP. CT. R. 17.06. 
 154. 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/8 (2004) (confidentiality); 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/7 (2004) 
(prohibiting mediator reports); 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/4(a) (2004) (stating that a mediation 
communication is privileged and undiscoverable; a party may refuse to disclose and may prevent 
others from disclosing communications). 
 155. Model Standards, supra note 16; CENTER FOR DISPUTE SETTLEMENT & THE INSTITUTE OF 
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, NATIONAL STANDARDS FOR COURT-CONNECTED MEDIATION 
PROGRAMS (1992), available at http://courtadr.org/files/NationalStandardsADR.pdf [hereinafter 
NATIONAL STANDARDS]. 
 156. UMA § 7. 
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mediator’s commitment to confidentiality means that the mediator, with a 
few exceptions, 157  cannot report any communications made during the 
course of mediation.  This includes reporting anything about bad faith/good 
faith participation in the mediation, even if the report is to the court.158  
Confidentiality of the proceeding guarantees that all parties involved have a 
safe place to explore options, without risk of exposing themselves to legal 
liability for their statements or questions.  In a few states, mediators may 
face reprimands or de-certification for breaches of confidentiality, including 
breaches for the purpose of reporting bad faith negotiating.159 
C. Neutrality 
Another reason that tasking mediators with bad faith/good faith analysis 
is unethical is because it requires mediators to make subjective 
determinations about the mediation and the parties therein.  Like 
confidentiality, neutrality is a core ethical value of mediation.160  It is 
necessary to promote confidence and trust, so the mediator may promote 
honest dialogue and party self-determination.161  If lawyers and parties think 
the mediator may make a subjective determination about their behavior, the 
lawyers and parties may not be forthcoming in the mediation, which 
jeopardizes the whole process.162 
 
 157. UMA § 8. 
 158. UMA at Reporter’s Notes. 
 159. Florida Mediator Ethics Advis. Comm., Op. FL-1992-95-GV (1992); Tenn. S.C. Alt. Disp. 
Resol. Comm., In re: James R. Finney (Nov. 2, 2006), available at 
http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/rule_31_mediator_adrc_grievance_decision_11-2-06.pdf. 
 160. Model Standards, supra note 16, at 5. 
 161. State v. Williams, 877 A.2d 1258, 1266 (N.J. 2005).  It is important to recognize that “[i]f 
mediation confidentiality is important, the appearance of mediator impartiality is imperative.  A 
mediator, although neutral, often takes an active role in promoting candid dialogue . . . To perform 
that function, a mediator must be able to instill the trust and confidence of the participants in the 
mediation process.  That confidence is insured if the participants trust that information conveyed to 
the mediator will remain in confidence.  Neutrality is the essence of the mediation process. . . .  
Thus, courts should be especially wary of mediator testimony because no matter how carefully 
presented, [it] will inevitably be characterized so as to favor one side or the other.”  (Citations 
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). 
 162. Indeed, servicer attorneys in Nevada have called mediators “biased” because they use 
“extreme enforcement of the rules” by finding servicers in bad faith for not wanting to reduce 
principal on a loan. Doug McMurdo, Lenders’ Conduct in Foreclosure Program Angers Justices, 
LAS VEGAS REV. J., Apr. 5, 2011, available at http://www.lvrj.com/news/lenders-conduct-in-
foreclosure-program-angers-justices-119291304.html?ref=304. 
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Few mediators are trained to make judgments that may have legal 
consequences, let alone judgments as vague as what constitutes good faith 
participation.163  Not even judges agree on what good faith participation 
means, calling it an “intangible and abstract quality with no technical 
meaning or statutory definition.”164 
Some may think that creating a definition for good faith may be 
worthwhile.  However, a definition of good faith, other than a description of 
a specific action (like not appearing at a mediation), is elusive.165  More 
intangible qualities, like fairness, appear in attempted definitions.  Defining 
good faith would only lead to a mediator having to make more subjective 
judgments.  This could allow mediator bias to influence judgments, further 
eroding the neutrality of mediation.  Additionally, mediators may be bound 
by other ethical rules (e.g., attorney ethics) that prohibit them from making 
such judgments.166 
Requiring or permitting disclosures about bad faith conduct would be 
particularly inadvisable for states that have adopted the UMA, for the court 
rule would be in direct conflict with state law.167  The Nevada Foreclosure 
Mediation program administrators considered this when creating their own 
mediator guidelines and roundly rejected any requirement of “good faith” 
evaluation.168  But, after political pressure to give the program more teeth, 
the program administrators not only allowed mediator reports of bad 
behavior, but the court also ruled that judges must follow the mediator’s 
suggestion of sanctions. 169   Even more inappropriate than making a 
subjective determination about what good faith participation means is 
making a subjective determination about sanctions for a party.170  This is 
directly contrary to the quality that distinguishes a mediator from a judge: 
both are impartial, but only a mediator is neutral as to the outcome.  By 
 
 163. Carol L. Izumi & Homer C. LaRue, Prohibiting “Good Faith” Reports Under the Uniform 
Mediation Act: Keeping the Adjudication Camel out of the Mediation Tent, 2003 J. DISP. RESOL. 67, 
71 (2003). 
 164. Doyle v. Gordon, 158 N.Y.S.2d 248, 259 (Sup. Ct. 1954). 
 165. Some scholars have created lists of behaviors that would fall under a good faith/bad faith 
definition.  See, e.g., Kovach, supra note 80, at 622–23. 
 166. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.4 (1983). 
 167. Resolution on Good Faith Requirements for Mediators and Mediation Advocates in Court-
Mandated Mediation Programs, A.B.A. SEC. DISP. RESOL. 4 (Aug. 7, 2004), available at 
www.abanet.org/dispute/draftres2.doc [hereinafter Resolution on Good Faith]; see e.g., WASH. REV. 
CODE § 7.07.060 (2005), available at 
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=7.07.060.7.07.060. 
 168. Walk the Talk, supra note 57, at n.20. 
 169. Walk the Talk, supra note 57, at 13. 
 170. Contra Walk the Talk, supra note 57, at 13. 
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essentially issuing an order for sanctions, the mediator has become a non-
neutral adjudicator. 
Requiring mediators to report on good faith/bad faith also jeopardizes 
the role of the judiciary.171  If mediators must share their good faith/bad faith 
evaluations with the trial court, even the most unbiased trial court will form 
a view of the parties before the court hears the merits of the case.  Even 
worse, the mediator’s judgment is based on a subjective standard.  The 
mediator has heard no evidence in the case nor knows the history of other 
motions the parties may have made.  Furthermore, the party to the mediation 
who gets reported for bad faith has little recourse for the impact the report 
may have.  The party may not challenge the report, and it is not subject to 
the rules of evidence.172  Ultimately, the mediator’s opinion could, and at 
least in Nevada does, decide the outcome of the case—the exact opposite of 
a mediator’s role.173 
D. Party Self-Determination174 
Another, less obvious, consequence of requiring mediators to report on 
the good faith participation of the parties is that parties may feel pressure to 
settle, even if settlement is not in their best interest.  Mediation programs are 
supposed to generate multiple options to resolve a case.  However, some 
servicers are coming to the negotiating table with only a “take it or leave it” 
offer, an offer which may represent the full extent of their authority.175  In an 
effort to force servicers to negotiate more, some housing advocates want 
programs to mandate and document the analysis of all possible alternatives 
to foreclosure in each mediation.176  But, even with the best of court 
 
 171. This is specifically what the National Standards hoped to address. See NATIONAL 
STANDARDS, supra note 155, at § 12.1 & Commentary. 
 172. See, e.g., N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:23C-7 (2004); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 99 (2001). 
 173. NATIONAL STANDARDS, supra note 155, at 12.2; Society of Professionals in Dispute 
Resolution, MANDATED PARTICIPATION AND SETTLEMENT COERCION: DISPUTE RESOLUTION AS IT 
RELATES TO THE COURTS 18 (1991). 
 174. For an excellent exploration of the power dynamic and self-determination principles in 
tension in foreclosure mediations, see Shana H. Khader, Mediating Mediations: Protecting the 
Homeowner’s Right to Self-Determination in Foreclosure Mediation Programs, 44 COLUM. J.L. & 
SOC. PROBS. 109, 129 (2010), available at 
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/jlsp/pdf/Fall%202010/Khader.JLSP.44.1.pdf. 
 175. Walsh, supra note 63, at 12; see also E-mail from Tina Cooper, Dir. of Cook Cnty. 
Foreclosure Mediation Program, to Heather Scheiwe Kulp, Staff Attorney, Resolution Sys. Inst. 
(Dec. 10, 2010) (on file with author). 
 176. Walsh, supra note 63, at 19; see also New Bill, supra note 144. 
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intentions, the parties, through exploring options, may understand “good 
faith participation” to mean “negotiat[ing] to the death.”  As the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York has recognized in 
overturning a servicer’s sanction for not conducting a full “risk analysis” in 
preparation for mediation, it is not always in the best interest of parties to 
keep negotiating, let alone to settle.177  Indeed, forcing negotiations threatens 
core values of mediation: party empowerment and self-determination.178  
Parties deserve to have a clear, simple behavioral guideline to follow in 
mediation because most parties do want to comply with the court’s order to 
mediate.179  Therefore, courts should not create policies that people may 
misinterpret as coercing parties into settlement.180 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROGRAM DESIGN TO PRESERVE 
CONFIDENTIALITY AND ENSURE ACCOUNTABILITY IN  
FORECLOSURE MEDIATION 
Foreclosure mediation program designers should look to the core values 
of mediation—which have existed long before the foreclosure crisis—when 
seeking to hold servicers and borrowers accountable and to protect the 
confidentiality and neutrality of the mediation process.  Quality dispute 
resolution system design can ensure accountability and protect the core 
values that make mediation a powerful, effective resolution process.181 
Element 1 Accountability: Attendance 
May Be the Responsibility of the Mediator 
 
Mediators do not violate any ethical rules, laws, or best practices in the 
dispute resolution field by indicating whether or not a party attended 
mediation.  It is an objective measure of party accountability for the process.  
 
 177. Jeffrey A. Wurst & Daniel L. McAuliffe, Southern District Establishes Standards for 
“Good Faith” Participation in Court-Ordered Mediation, 9 ABF J. 59, 59-60 (July/Aug. 2011). 
 178. Ulrich Boettger, Efficiency Versus Party Empowerment—Against a Good-Faith 
Requirement In Mandatory Mediation, REV. LITIG. 1, 2 (2004). 
 179. See Good Faith Participation in Mediation: Recent Decisions in New York and California, 
BUS. LITIG. REP. (Quinn Emanuel, Los Angeles, C.A.), Jan. 10, 2012, available at 
http://www.quinnemanuel.com/media/247355/qe%20january%202012%20newsletter.pdf. 
 180. Alon Cohen & Andrew Jakabovics, Now We’re Talking, Center for American Progress 
(2010)), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/issues/2010/06/pdf/foreclosure_mediation.pdf [hereinafter Now We’re Talking]; 
Walk the Talk, supra note 57, at 10. 
 181. John Lande, Using Dispute System Design Methods to Promote Good-Faith Participation 
in Court-Connected Mediation Programs, 50 UCLA L. REV. 69, 75–76 (2002). 
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Thus, the mediator may fulfill Element 1a Accountability.  But, the 
challenges indicated above with assuring attendance, and attendance of 
someone who has authority to settle, are best addressed with the following 
provisions. 
 
1. Make mediation mandatory so people have an expectation interest in 
attending, and support outreach programs that inform as many 
participants as possible about the program and its potential benefits.182  
Most current foreclosure mediation programs are optional, meaning 
borrowers have to request mediation.  About one percent of borrowers in 
foreclosure in these states opt in to mediation.183  Some people are just 
giving up their homes.  But, this low opt-in number also likely reflects 
both the difficulty in getting people to sign up for new programs and the 
lack of public education about the mediation process.  The low opt in 
rate also shows the benefits of automatic programs, where borrowers in 
foreclosure are scheduled for mediation when the foreclosure is filed, 
that result in over fifty percent participation.184  In comparison to the 
mere threats of a mediator’s report, automatic programs seem to be more 
effective in ensuring broader attendance. 
 
2. Allow for scheduling flexibility.  While administrative costs increase 
with every missed mediation, few programs experience “no-shows” 
regularly.  Allowing parties to reschedule one mediation apiece leaves 
room so that unforeseen circumstances will not jeopardize the process.  
Administrators must ensure that parties know they must call within a 
reasonable time before the mediation to reschedule. 
 
3. Create an official opportunity for parties to work together prior to 
mediation.  This could occur at a court hearing or at a pre-mediation 
conference.  Parties may exchange documents, educate one another, and 
start negotiating before the mediation.  Preparatory activities can make 
the actual mediation more effective. 
 
 182. Now We’re Talking, supra note 180, at 1-2; Walk the Talk, supra note 57, at 10–11. 
 183. Alon Cohen, The Latest Mortgage Mediation Lesson: Maryland’s Experience Points the 
Way Forward, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (Jan. 19, 2011), 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/housing/news/2011/01/19/8946/the-latest-mortgage_-
mediation_-lesson.html [hereinafter Latest]. 
 184. Latest, supra note 183; Now We’re Talking, supra note 180; Anthony Klan, States Try to 
Force Mortgage Workouts, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 2010, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704543004576051843140821936.html. 
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4. Provide means for electronic participation.185  Most servicers have 
established call centers where servicer employees with modification 
authority sit with the borrower data on a computer screen in front of 
them.  If programs create environments conducive to this electronic 
participation, they can ensure people with greater authority are present. 
 
5. Ensure the location for the mediations can accommodate program 
designs that both maintain confidentiality (i.e., are not too close to other 
mediators or courtrooms) and allow electronic connectivity to phone and 
to online chat services or other forms of communication with their 
clients.  This may require mediations to occur in courthouses, arbitration 
centers, community meeting halls, houses of worship, or government 
buildings with wireless internet and multiple phone lines.  Along with 
confidentiality, stakeholders should consider ADA accessibility and the 
appearance of neutrality in choosing the location. 
 
6. Ensure that programs have clear mediator reporting forms that give 
information about who was present at the mediation.  The fewer open-
ended questions on the reporting form, the lower the possibility that the 
mediator will share subjective interpretations of the mediation. 186 
 
 185. Some legal questions remain about whether telephonic appearance constitutes appearance. 
A 2008 Wisconsin trial court sanctioned an insurance company, whose representative appeared by 
phone in a non-foreclosure mediation, for breaching a court order.  See Lee v. Geico Indem. Co., 776 
N.W.2d 622 (Wis. 2009), available at http://www.wisbar.org/res/capp/2009/2008ap003125.htm.  
The state statute required: “Each corporate party or other legal entity which is a party shall appear by 
an individual other than the attorney, which individual shall have full authority to negotiate in this 
matter . . . .” WIS. STAT. § 802.12 (1993) (emphasis added).  In the foreclosure mediation context, no 
statutes as yet require a representative other than an attorney to appear.  A lender representative 
(attorney) is almost always physically present in the mediation and has access to a lender phone bank 
to discuss options.  Courts could avoid conflicting with other state rulings regarding appearance at 
mediation by including in the standard foreclosure mediation court order an allowance for phone 
participation.   
 186. These exceptions are limited: 
(1) in an agreement evidenced by a record signed by all parties to the 
agreement; (2) available to the public under [insert statutory reference to open 
records act] or made during a session of a mediation which is open, or is 
required by law to be open, to the public; (3) a threat or statement of a plan to 
inflict bodily injury or commit a crime of violence; (4) intentionally used to 
plan a crime, attempt to commit or commit a crime, or to conceal an ongoing 
crime or ongoing criminal activity; (5) sought or offered to prove or disprove a 
claim or complaint of professional misconduct or malpractice filed against a 
mediator; (6) except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), sought or offered 
to prove or disprove a claim or complaint of professional misconduct or 
malpractice filed against a mediation party, nonparty participant, or 
representative of a party based on conduct occurring during a mediation; or (7) 
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7. Rely on the judge’s determination of standing so that mediators can 
avoid making an initial legal inquiry, such as whether the servicer has 
authority to foreclose on the home.187  Judges often determine who has 
the right to bring the case, and who is responsible for defending the 
case; judges are far better suited than mediators to make this 
determination.188 Mediators retain the ability to question whether all 
parties necessary to settle a case are present. 
 
8. Ensure that a clear rule about what is confidential is in the mediation 
agreement and both parties sign it, including the parties with authority to 
settle.  Make electronic signatures possible if that would assist in 
ensuring the authorized person is able to participate.  While an 
agreement reflecting the rule may not be necessary (if a rule is in place, 
parties must follow it regardless of an agreement), the act of signing an 
agreement reminds parties of their commitment to attend and, if the 
mediation results in a settlement, to do what is required by the 
settlement.  People are more likely to fulfill an agreement they sign.189 
 
sought or offered to prove or disprove abuse, neglect, abandonment, or 
exploitation in a proceeding in which a child or adult protective services agency 
is a party . . . (b) There is no privilege under Section 4 if a court, administrative 
agency, or arbitrator finds, after a hearing in camera, that the party seeking 
discovery or the proponent of the evidence has shown that the evidence is not 
otherwise available, that there is a need for the evidence that substantially 
outweighs the interest in protecting confidentiality, and that the mediation 
communication is sought or offered in: (1) a court proceeding involving a 
felony [or misdemeanor]; or (2) except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), 
a proceeding to prove a claim to rescind or reform or a defense to avoid liability 
on a contract arising out of the mediation.  (c) A mediator may not be 
compelled to provide evidence of a mediation communication referred to in 
subsection (a)(6) or (b)(2).  (d) If a mediation communication is not privileged 
under subsection (a) or (b), only the portion of the communication necessary 
for the application of the exception from nondisclosure may be admitted.  
Admission of evidence under subsection (a) or (b) does not render the evidence, 
or any other mediation communication, discoverable or admissible for any 
other purpose.   
UMA, supra note 28, at § 6. 
 187. Walsh, supra note 63, at 18. 
 188. Edward F. Sherman, Court-Mandated Alternative Dispute Resolution: What Form of 
Participation Should Be Required?, 46 SMU L. REV. 2079, 2094–111 (1993). 
 189. Carol M. Werner et al., Commitment, Behavior, and Attitude Change: An Analysis of 
Voluntary Recycling, 15 J. ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 197 (1996) (finding that those who signed a contract to 
commit to recycling were more likely to participate, and likely to participate more than once, in a 
recycling program than those who simply agreed verbally in person to participate). 
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9. Let the court decide what to do with information on the mediation 
form rather than have mediators recommend a particular course of 
action.  The court should determine whether it wants to find bad faith if 
necessary parties do not appear after the one allowable, excused 
rescheduling.  If the court wants to find bad faith for necessary parties 
not appearing, then it should make that determination, not the 
mediator.190 
 
Element 2 Accountability: Document Exchange 
Should Be Responsibility of Non-mediator 
Mediator May Have Limited Responsibility 
 
In non-foreclosure mediations, it is common for the court or the 
mediator to require some document exchange in preparation for the 
negotiation process.  This is simply due diligence.  The challenge in 
foreclosure situations is that each loan and each modification option has a 
different set of documents required for an application, and each borrower 
has a different set of circumstances that may require different documents.  
So, even if programs create a standardized list of the most commonly 
requested documents, it would not be sufficient for most loan modification 
applications or borrower circumstances.  Rather than coming up with an 
incomplete list to be exchanged before or during mediation and to be used in 
evaluations of party participation, the program process should support open 
communication about document exchange before, during, and after 
mediation sessions. 
 
1. Work with servicers to improve the communication systems available 
to borrowers prior to and during the foreclosure process.191  Per the $26 
billion settlement in 2012 between forty-nine states’ attorneys general 
and five major banks, servicers should designate a contact person for 
each borrower so the borrower can make phone calls and e-mails to one 
person and be assured of reaching someone who can communicate about 
 
 190. Lande, supra note 55, at 84–85; David S. Winston, Participation Standards in Mandatory 
Mediation Statutes: “You Can Lead a Horse to Water. . . .,” 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 187, 
201 (1996). 
 191. SHAH, supra note 85, at 4, 15. 
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his or her case.192  This would relieve some of the initial frustrations in 
the mediation process that stunt open communication between borrower 
and servicer and lead to what some see as bad faith communication. 
 
2. Courts or government agencies could require servicers, prior to 
mediation, to provide proof that: (1) the servicer is the entity responsible 
for enforcing the mortgage, and (2) the borrower is actually delinquent 
on the mortgage. These two showings are the basic requirements for 
property cases that, in the deluge of foreclosure cases, are sometimes 
ignored.193  This gap leads housing advocates to call for documentation 
of these two showings in mediation.  The court makes these 
determinations, not the mediator or the mediation administrator. 194  
Though potentially onerous, these two threshold legal questions should 
be decided prior to any mediation. 
 
3. Use housing counselors to make document preparation less 
burdensome for borrowers195 and more complete for servicers.  Housing 
counselors can also explain the concepts that confuse the borrowers, 
leading to more educated borrowers going into the mediation.  Housing 
counselors can also help borrowers gather paperwork needed for a 
HAMP loan modification.  Perhaps most importantly, they can help 
borrowers assess what amount of money they can afford to put toward 
housing costs. 
 
4. Require a pre-mediation session without the mediator to discuss 
documents needed for that particular case.  This could be done by 
phone, if necessary.  Although this will not resolve all document 
questions, it will help the official mediation process retain its character 
as a forum for discussing options.  Pre-mediation sessions should not 
 
 192. Nelson D. Schwartz, Some Doubt a Settlement Will End Mortgage Ills, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
20, 2012, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/21/business/some-doubt-a-
settlement-will-end-mortgage-ills.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 193. See Thomas J. Sheeran, Ohio Case Might Add to Lender Problems, ASSOC. PRESS, Nov. 
16, 2007, available at http://www.ohio.com/news/nation/ohio-case-might-add-to-lender-problems-
1.70387.  This is an exception rather than the norm. 
 194. Contra Walsh, supra note 63, at VII. 
 195. Thomas Grillo, Mayor Calls for Mediation Before Foreclosure, BOSTON HERALD, Dec. 
10, 2010, 
http://bostonherald.com/business/real_estate/2010/12/mayor_calls_mediation_foreclosure. 
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include an evaluation of whether the case is “good” for mediation; this 
should happen prior to a pre-mediation session.196 
 
5. Create document exchange requirements flexible enough to allow 
modification for legitimate hardships or confusion on the part of either 
party. 
 
6. Create an educational sheet defining foreclosure language and 
describing some of the different loan modification options. Parties may 
reference this sheet in mediation. Programs should ensure that the 
information referenced in the sheet comes from a neutral, reliable 
source. 
 
7. Have the governing entity, not the mediator, review compliance with 
a requirement that the servicer provide a reason for a loan modification 
denial.197 The mediator should not be in the position to judge any 
document exchange as sufficient or insufficient, or to evaluate document 
accuracy.198 
Element 3 Accountability: Good Faith Participation 
Should Never Be Responsibility of Mediator 
 
Courts and the UMA are clear; mediation programs deem lack of 
attendance, lack of settlement authority, and lack of providing the required 
pre-mediation paperwork to be bad faith. 199   So, how can foreclosure 
mediation programs increase the likelihood that parties will willingly 
participate in the process and also preserve the role of the mediator?  
 
 196. This would greatly slow down the process and result in far fewer mediations occurring. 
See, e.g., Now We’re Talking, supra note 180; See Walk the Talk, supra note 57, at 19.  
 197. See, e.g., Maryland’s Foreclosure Mediation Program, which requires lenders to evaluate 
the loan modification application and provide a response in writing prior to proceeding to any 
mediation.  Maryland’s Foreclosure Mediation, MARYLAND, THE HOPE INITIATIVE, 
http://mdhope.dhcd.maryland.gov/ForeclosureMediation/Pages/default.aspx (last visited June 6, 
2014). 
 198. Steve Kanigher, In Nevada, a Fight over Foreclosure Paperwork, LAS VEGAS SUN, Oct. 
25, 2010, http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2010/oct/25/fighting-over-foreclosure-paperwork/ 
(citing a mediator who rejects the speculation that mediators should review documents and 
reiterating that document review is the realm of the judge, not the mediator). 
 199. Lande, supra note 55, at 86; Hunt v. Woods, 1996 WL 8037 (6th Cir. 1996); Nick v. 
Morgan’s Foods, 99 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (E.D. Mo. 2000), aff’d 270 F.3d 590 (8th Cir. 2001); In re 
Acceptance Insurance Co., 33 S.W.3d 443 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000); Graham v. Baker, 447 N.W.2d 397 
(Iowa 1989); Decker v. Lindsay, 824 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992). 
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Thoughtful program design, monitoring, and evaluation will put into place a 
structure to support voluntary good faith participation without requiring the 
mediator to jeopardize his neutrality. 
 
1. Involve all organizational stakeholder groups in the creation of 
mediation programs.200  This will lessen the likelihood that one party 
will be resentful of the process, and thus less likely to participate 
willingly.  This also mitigates, as much as possible, one party’s 
resentment over having to go to a program in which they have no say.  It 
also helps court administrators, judges, bank employees, servicer 
attorneys, legal aid attorneys, housing advocates, and borrowers build 
rapport before they enter tense situations.201 
 
2. Rely on the judge’s or other authority figure’s determination that the 
servicer foreclosed properly202 instead of relying on the mediator to 
make such findings herself.203  This inquiry is different than whether the 
servicer participates in the mediation in good faith, and it is proper only 
for the courts to decide. 
 
3. Ensure the judge or government agency educates parties about 
expectations in mediation—good faith, self-determination, and 
confidentiality—at the beginning of the court process and when the case 
is referred to mediation.  In Connecticut, this occurs in the judge’s 
order.204  The judge can also ensure the parties receive oral instruction 
about expectations in mediation at any court appearance.  The mediator 
should also clearly explain the process and good faith participation 
expectations to parties at the beginning of the first mediation session.  
Clearly identified goals for the mediation will set those goals in the 
parties’ minds and will give the mediator a reference point should the 
mediation head in a “bad faith” direction.205 
 
 
 200. Resolution on Good Faith, supra note 167, at 4. 
 201. Id. at 4-5. 
 202. See, e.g., U.S. Bank Nat’l Assn. v. Mathon, No. 2007-30481, 2010 WL 4910164, at *5 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 1, 2010). 
 203. Contra, e.g., U.S. Bank Nat’l Assn. v. Mathon, No. 2007-30481, 2010 WL 4910164, at *5 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 1, 2010). 
 204. Uniform Foreclosure Mediation Standing Orders, STATE OF CONN. SUP. CT. (2010), 
available at http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/super/Standorders/Civil/FMP_010510.pdf. 
 205. See id. 
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4. Explain during referral (judge) and at the beginning of mediation 
(mediator) that there is no pressure to settle and that if the mediation 
does not result in a settlement, the parties have the right to go before the 
judge.  This relieves parties from feeling like they have to consider 
every option (at risk of being judged to be in bad faith) and empowers 
them to decline options that do not make sense.  Negotiation is about 
considering options that meet needs, not considering a laundry list of 
options.206 
 
 5. Do not force parties to talk about specific options; trust the mediator’s 
 skill to help parties make their own determination about what is in their
 best interest to discuss.  In the interest of exploring many loan 
 modification options, some courts want to require mediators to report on 
 whether the servicer considered options in good faith.  However, 
 because confidentiality protects the mediation process from disclosure, 
 the court cannot force the parties to communicate about specific options.  
 Neither can mediators, who are neutral, require parties to consider 
 particular options.  A mediator can ask questions to get the servicer and 
 borrower thinking about what a court might require: proof that a 
 borrower applied for HAMP, explanation of a denial, documentation to 
 support a denial, etc.  A mediator can also ask questions of the borrower 
 to see if they understand an explanation about the denial.207 
 
6. Train mediators to ask probing, yet unbiased, questions.  Training 
also helps mediators level the playing field to avoid abuse and to check 
their own prejudices at the door.208  Mediators should also be trained in 
loan modification language and options, so they can ask questions that 
may help the parties discuss more serious alternatives to foreclosure.209 
 
7. Build in accountability measures (i.e., pro bono counsel) for the 
borrowers and counsel for the servicer in the mediation room.  While 
mediators can help guide the process of mediation, they cannot and 
should not replace counsel as the guard against misconduct, especially if 
 
 206. Walk the Talk, supra note 57, at 10, 12. 
 207. Some programs, like Vermont’s, require lenders to provide a written reason for denying a 
loan modification.  This decision should be the realm of the courts; if the courts require production 
of such a document, it should be done in a housing counseling session or in formal court 
proceedings. See, e.g., SHAH, supra note 85, at 12.  The mediator should not require any party to 
produce any documentation, as the mediation is not an official discovery process.  See, e.g., SHAH, 
supra note 85, at 12.  The mediator should not require any party to produce any documentation, as 
the mediation is not an official discovery process. 
 208. Walk the Talk, supra note 57, at 12. 
 209. See Walsh, supra note 63, at 19. 
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the mediators are attorneys themselves.210  Parties or their attorneys 
should be the ones to report misconduct to the court.211  In the ABA 
Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the ABA Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct, attorneys have an ethical obligation to report 
the misconduct of other attorneys.212  Many states do not expressly 
require reporting, but allow it and privilege it.213  To have this type of 
accountability, though, programs need to supply pro bono counsel to 
self-represented borrowers.214 
 
8. Ensure program administrators review each mediation session with 
the mediator and discuss any issues that arose.  Because this 
conversation is between two people from the same dispute resolution 
program, the conversation is still confidential in most states.  The 
benefit: it allows mediators to vent about frustrations and decreases the 
temptation to report “bad” behavior to the court.  Also, this process 
assists with better program development; if the program identifies 
problems, consider how to design the system differently to counter 
negative participation.215 
 
9. Be wary of using subjective terms to describe behavior.  Some 
suggest the court or legislature define what “good faith” means.216  
However, defining “good faith,” which would likely involve more 
 
 210. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.4 (1983). 
 211. NATIONAL STANDARDS, supra note 155, at 12.3. 
 212. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-103(A) (1980); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (1983). 
 213. See, e.g., San Diego Cnty. Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 1992-2 (1992), 
available at http://www.sdcba.org/index.cfm?Pg=ethicsopinion92-2 (California); Colo. Bar Ass’n 
Ethics Comm., Op. 64 Duty of Attorney to Report an Ethical Violation (1983) (rev. 1996), available 
at http://www.cobar.org/repository/Ethics/FormalEthicsOpion/FormalEthicsOpinion_64_2011.pdf 
(Colorado); State Bar of Ariz. Ethics Comm., Op. 90-13 (Oct. 16, 1990), available at 
http://www.azbar.org/Media/_Ethics/90-13.pdf (Arizona, discussing Illinois case). 
 214. Increasingly, program advocates believe that having representation for the homeowners is 
necessary for program success. John Schwartz, Judges Berate Bank Lawyers in Foreclosure, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 11, 2011, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/11/business/11lawyers.html?pagewanted=all. 
 215. Lande, supra note 55, at 76. 
 216. A Homeowner’s Guide to Foreclosure Mediation, NW. JUSTICE PROJECT (Oct. 2011), 
available at http://www.walawhelp.com/documents/4993016212EN.pdf?stateabbrev=/WA/ 
(enumerating what it means for both sides to participate in good faith); Jesse D. Stewart, Maine’s 
Foreclosure Mediation Program: What Should Constitute a Good Faith Effort to Mediate?,64 ME. 
L. REV. 249 (2011) (recommending that Maine’s foreclosure mediation program “empower[] 
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subjective terminology like “reasonable” or “congenial,” seems as 
productive as allowing mediators to make subjective determinations 
about what “good faith” means.  Indeed, only one of twenty-three 
jurisdictions that listed “good faith” requirements in mediation statutes 
actually defined what “good faith” means.217  Sanctions, like laws, are 
meant to change specific bad behavior and promote specific good 
behavior.  Therefore, only clear, objective criteria should be used to 
sanction bad behavior in mediations.  If anyone is to determine what is 
sanctionable, it should be the courts, not mediators.218 
 
10. Do not call the process mediation or call the neutrals mediators if 
the 
neutral is reporting on bad faith participation.219  The Providence and 
Philadelphia programs called the process conciliation to avoid the 
connotations that come with mediation.  However, programs must 
decide if reporting on bad faith is a higher priority than using actual 
mediators and conducting professional mediation sessions. 
 
11. Develop a monitoring system to track satisfaction with the 
mediation process from parties and the mediator.  This will help 
programs flag any reoccurring feedback and make adjustments in the 
process as needed. 
 
12. Conduct a thorough evaluation of the program’s operations, 
including whether the chosen process is preserving the core values of 
mediation. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Mediation program developers perform a balancing act.  They must 
determine the goals of the program and the public policies governing it, 
weigh the interests of its stakeholders, and comply with various statutory, 
administrative, and professional standards.  As the foreclosure mediation 
context demonstrates, these factors often conflict. 
Mediation confidentiality and neutrality are sometimes at odds with 
measures meant to hold parties accountable for participating fairly in the 
 
mediators and judges to carefully monitor the mortgagee’s good faith at mediation based on clear, 
predictable, and realistic criteria” such as how the NPV is conducted and what documents are 
exchanged). 
 217. Lande, supra note 55, at 80. 
 218. Resolution on Good Faith, supra note 167, at 2. 
 219. Walk the Talk, supra note 57, at 11. 
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mediation process.  The need for courts to ensure just processes may mean 
they do not interfere with much of the mediation process.  In the midst of 
these seemingly incompatible characteristics, however, courts can develop 
foreclosure mediation programs that serve borrowers, servicers, and the 
justice system well.  Specifically, foreclosure mediation developers should 
carefully consider how the program’s mediator reporting requirements might 
conflict with mediator ethical rules. 
First, courts can hold parties accountable for attending the mediation.  
Attendance is the basic requirement for borrowers and servicers to 
communicate about alternatives to foreclosure.  Without a mechanism to 
enforce attendance, foreclosure mediation programs lose their primary 
strength: communication between two parties in conflict, facilitated by a 
skilled third-party neutral.  However, courts, not mediators, should 
determine what sanctions are appropriate for non-attendance.  Mediators 
should allow exceptions for unforeseen circumstances in the event of urgent 
changes to the parties’ schedules. 
Second, courts can monitor document exchange as part of a pre-
mediation or post-mediation court process.  However, even if mediation 
serves as a forum for document exchange, the courts cannot review what is 
exchanged.  Mediators are most effective when they can ask questions about 
the documents presented, rather than serving as a go-between for document 
exchange.  To prepare for the mediation, courts can require a pre-mediation 
conference where parties communicate about what documents they must 
bring before considering alternatives to foreclosure.  Conference facilitators 
should ask questions about documents and facilitate both parties’ greater 
understanding of the foreclosure and any alternative process, including 
mediation. 
Third, foreclosure mediation program developers should ensure they are 
familiar with mediator ethical guidelines.  Some provisions strictly prohibit 
mediators from reporting on a party’s level of participation in the mediation 
process.  Even if the state’s guidelines do not prohibit such reporting, 
developers should weigh whether preserving confidentiality and neutrality 
for all mediations or reporting a few rogue parties is more important to the 
program.  Good faith is a difficult concept to define, let alone objectively 
judge. 
Fourth, by monitoring the overall program, courts can determine if there 
are ongoing issues that need to be addressed.  Effective monitoring requires 
receiving input from all participants, including mediators and parties.  
Having regular mediator meetings adds an additional layer of program 
monitoring beyond written survey forms.  Once there is sufficient data, a 
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more thorough evaluation could demonstrate how the program is working 
relative to its stated goals and values. 
Foreclosure mediation development requires a thoughtful group of 
people to determine the best way to balance competing goals.  Once begun, 
programs must also subject themselves to rigorous evaluation.  Monitoring, 
collecting data, and evaluating the process will keep the initially set out 
values in check.  Only by involving interested parties at all stages of 
program development will foreclosure mediation programs ensure the core 
values of the mediation process serve to relieve the foreclosure crisis. 
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